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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to identify the confluence of the law 
and economics disciplines, using these distinct channels of scholarship 
not as an empirical vessel to determine the “value” or “valueless” nature 
of water, but rather as a means to reconcile externalities among interested 
parties and to identify management strategies that embrace sentiments of 
economic efficiency throughout the arena of global hydrocommerce. 
The various perspectives on water, particularly with regards to an 
increasing global population and demand for freshwater, elicits an 
intricate mosaic of tensions concerning the availability, accessibility, 
provision, and protection of this fundamental natural resource. 
Billions of individuals around the world lack access to basic water 
and sanitation services. Despite the prevalence of these atrocities, access 
to water is both an individual human right and necessary for human 
survival. The legal basis for the human right to water, in terms of 
availability, quality, and accessibility, was adopted by the U.N. in its 
General Comment No. 15. Despite recognition by the U.N., more than 
1.1 billion people do not have sufficient access to clean water, while 2.6 
billion people have no provision for sanitation. Against this tragic and 
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inexcusable backdrop, the public sector either lacks the financial 
resources to provide water or continues to operate water distribution 
schemes with undesirable inefficiency. From a pragmatic standpoint—
and to ensure that citizens have access to clean water—there exist 
circumstances, both in reality and in the text of the General Comment, 
whereupon governments should be compelled, or at least be encouraged, 
to solicit capital investment from the private sector in order to construct 
adequate water infrastructure and manage water distribution services. 
Researchers estimate that over the next twenty years almost $22 
trillion (USD) will be necessary to fully modernize global water delivery 
and wastewater systems. Water scarcity, an individual’s lack of access to 
clean water, arises due to economic and physical constraints, while being 
influenced by managerial, institutional, and political factors. At its core, 
the primary challenge for nations concerning their respective water 
distribution schemes is a lack of adequate financial resources. In 
developing countries, an estimated ninety-seven percent of all water 
distribution is managed by public-sector suppliers. The inept realities 
concerning these water distribution systems in developing countries, and 
the fact that over a billion people still lack access to this essential 
resource, suggests that governments retain at least some responsibility in 
the persistence of the global water crisis. Reconciliation is the next step 
in the human right to water argument—from its theoretical origins to its 
pragmatic implementation—and may be realized through a law and 
economics analysis in support of private-sector participation in the 
delivery of water and funding for the provision of adequate 
infrastructure. Much like distinct tributaries to a mighty river, the legal 
and economic disciplines maintain differences in methodology, scientific 
approach, and objectives; but as these disciplines converge, their 
tributaries form the river’s main stem, with potential to influence an 
entire watershed of jurisprudence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
You can comprehend a piece of river. A whole river . . . 
is a thousand differing and not compatible things in-between . . . . 
It is also an entity, one of the real wholes, but to feel 
the whole is hard because to know it is harder still.1 
 
Enriched with notions of cultural, religious, and biological 
significance, the principles of water flow counter to the theoretical 
currents of the law and economics analysis.2 The legal and economic 
disciplines maintain differences in methodology, scientific approach, 
and objectives that converge, much like distinct tributaries to a mighty 
river, with potential to influence an entire watershed of jurisprudence. 
Despite the seemingly ambitious task of resolving global water issues 
at the intersection of law and economics, one potential solution is a 
matter of shifting the baseline perspective—similar to the “change of 
approach” suggested by R.H. Coase in The Problem of Social Cost.3 
Perhaps the economics of water is a matter of perspective, in which a 
shifting baseline—from economic value to economic efficiency—could 
be beneficial to various sectors within the global water crisis. The law 
and economics approach provides a platform to reconcile individual, 
social, sovereign, and private-sector perspectives through directed 
efforts at improving efficiency, reducing bargaining costs, and 
promoting fairness. This approach does not cabin itself into a free-
market advocacy position, nor does it exclusively promote a human 
rights perspective. Objectivity is maintained by exploring issues from a 
scientific perspective, thereby embracing an ecological approach that 
seeks interdisciplinary solutions by recognizing these symbiotic 
contradictions. 
During the last several decades, the nexus between economic 
development, water resources, and human rights has achieved 
 
 1.  JOHN GRAVES, GOODBYE TO A RIVER 4 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1960). 
 2.  “The river of God is full of water.” Psalm 65:9 (English Standard). The Qur’an further 
recognizes the essential nature of water, the following verse being perhaps among the first to 
predict water-derived conflicts that would affect desert climates: “[a]nd Allah has sent down rain 
from the sky and given life thereby to the earth after its lifelessness. Indeed in that is a sign for a 
people who listen.” Qur’an, 16:65 (Sahih International).  
 3.  R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 42 (1960) [hereinafter 
Social Cost]. Coase explained, “[i]n devising and choosing between social arrangements we should 
have regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which I am advocating.” 
Id. at 44. 
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prominence as one of the most compelling issues in the global agenda. 
Although many distinguished scholars survey these challenges, there 
exists an inherent presumption that the right to water and private-
sector investment are incompatible. The purpose of this Article is to 
identify the confluence of these distinct channels of scholarship, using 
law and economics not as an empirical vessel to determine the “value” 
or “valueless” nature of water, but rather as a means to reconcile 
externalities among interested parties and to identify management 
strategies that embrace sentiments of economic efficiency throughout 
the global hydrocommerce arena.4 Billions of individuals throughout 
the world lack access to basic water and sanitation services—the 
prevalence of which is an unfortunate reality that cannot be 
understated. To combat this tragedy, the justiciability of the human 
right to water continues to develop into an enforceable obligation.5 
Countries are obligated to ensure the accessibility and availability of 
water to its citizens. These concepts are not a matter of law, economics, 
or science. Access to water is an individual right and necessary for 
human survival. Against this tragic and inexcusable backdrop, the 
public sector nevertheless continues to operate water distribution 
schemes with undesirable inefficiency.6 From a pragmatic standpoint, 
to ensure that citizens have access to clean water, there exist 
circumstances whereupon governments should be compelled, or at 
least be encouraged, to solicit private-sector capital investment in 
 
 4.  Summit Global Management, an investment firm that specializes in “global 
hydrocommerce,” describes the sector as follows: “Water—is the most . . . critical industrial input 
to the world’s economy . . . water remains absurdly undervalued.” Summit Global Management, 
Introduction to Water Investing 2010 2 (2010). On the different values of water: “But exactly how 
valuable is water? A truer account would reflect several underlying realities. First, water has no 
economic substitute . . . . Second, we can neither create nor destroy water . . . . Third, while we 
obviously use more water as the world population grows, we also use more water on a per capita 
basis as industrialization, urbanization, and standards of living advance.” Id. 
 5.  See, e.g., Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 957 (2004) (asserting that “[t]he recognition of a singular right which could satisfy 
the entirety of States’ obligations under international law should provide greater clarity and 
consistency in interpretation”); Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: 
Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 331 (2005) (discussing implications of customary law in the international arena). 
 6.  “In many [developing] countries, a the majority of people still lack access to safe [and 
clean] drinking water.” See Hugo Tremblay, A Clash of Paradigms in the Water Sector? Tensions 
and Synergies between Integrated Water Resources Management and the Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Development, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 307, 319 (2011) (discussing that “[i]n many 
countries, the majority of people still lack access to safe drinking water”); see also WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. & U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND, PROGRESS ON SANITATION AND DRINKING WATER: 
2010 UPDATE 7 (2010) (reporting that “884 million people in the world still do not get their 
drinking-water from improved sources”).  
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order to construct adequate water infrastructure and manage water 
distribution services.7 
The provision of water presents numerous challenges to all parties 
involved in any particular transaction. When examined through the 
lens of law and economics—such as the Coase Theorem and its 
transaction cost analysis, or various concepts of economic efficiency 
and externalities—this approach maintains an avenue that facilitates 
the reconciliation of competing water industry regimes, while 
providing individuals with access to these fundamental resources, and 
simultaneously creating investment opportunities for the private 
sector. This Article does not propose an argument in favor of outright 
privatization; rather, it argues that countries should be encouraged to 
seek capital investments for water distribution systems and 
infrastructure. As a practical matter, this could prove to be the most 
efficient way that many countries can even begin to fulfill their 
obligations to ensure delivery of the right to water. 
In the arena of international law, recognition by the United 
Nations (“U.N.”) in 2002 and 2010 of the human right to safe drinking 
water and sanitation has propelled the global water crisis to the 
forefront of legal scholarship.8 The human right to water leaves states 
 
 7.  Even in highly developed regions (i.e., United States & Western Europe), governments, 
citizens, and private-sector investors benefit from massive investments in water infrastructure, the 
total dollar value being in the trillions (USD). See Richard Ashley & Adrian Cashman, The 
Impacts of Change on the Long-Term Future Demand for Water Sector Infrastructure, in 
INFRASTRUCTURE TO 2030: TELECOM, LAND TRANSPORT, WATER AND ELECTRICITY, ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 28,29 (2005); see also WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAMME, WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD: THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 3, UNESCO 58 (2009). There are various examples of public-sector and 
private-sector management of water utilities, each with successes and failures, throughout the 
developed world.  
 8.  Both the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Human Rights Council recognized the 
human right to safe drinking water and sanitation. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., 
Soc., & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 (2002): The Right 
to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002.11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15]; G.A. Res. 
64/292 (Aug. 3, 2010); G.A. Res 64/PV.108 (July 28, 2010); Press Release, General Assembly, 
General Assembly Adopts Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human 
Right, By Recorded Vote of 122 in Favour, None Against, 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release 
GA/10967 (Jul. 28 2010). Enforceability of these rights, on the other hand, remains an important 
development in legal scholarship, as discussed infra, Section IV.B. See also Sharmila L. Murthy, 
The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning, and the Controversy Over-
Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 89 (2013); M. Belén Olmos Giupponi and Martha C. 
Paz, The Implementation of the Human Right to Water in Argentina and Colombia, XV ANUARIO 
MEXICANO DE DER. INTERNACIONAL 323, 326 (2015) (“The enforceability of the right to water 
and, in general, of Economic, Cultural and Social Rights is a transnational issue which has been 
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with an obligation to ensure its citizens have access to water. 
Simultaneously, states that lack the necessary capital are constrained 
in providing this right, which is predicated upon maintaining adequate 
water distribution systems and infrastructure.9 The lack of sufficient 
funding is brutally apparent when considering the billions of people 
that lack access to safe drinking water and sanitation.10 Given the vast 
funding gap for water infrastructure, public funds alone are likely not 
sufficient even in developed countries.11 
On the other hand, the markets for global hydrocommerce 
continue to suffer from “chronic under-investment” according to 
financial institutions.12 Estimates indicate that over the next twenty 
years, almost $22 trillion (USD) will be necessary to fully modernize 
global water delivery and wastewater systems.13 Currents of economic 
efficiency present a unique perspective, however, particularly with 
regards to private investment within the project-based realm of the 
global water infrastructure industry: a scenario that maintains a system 
of efficiency at all levels benefitting governments, individuals, and 
third-party investors. Efficiency extends to individuals who otherwise 
would not be able to access their right, while also benefitting state 
governments, who otherwise could not provide the necessary water 
infrastructure, but would then enjoy the indirect economic benefits of 
a healthier country over the long-term.  In effect, by embracing these 
symbiotic contradictions through the lens of law and economics, we 
may be in a better position to resolve global water resource challenges. 
These paradigms are compatible on a pragmatic level. Based on 
the foundation that water is a legal right, an economic approach to 
water management becomes essential to the development of legal 
 
raised by prominent scholarship over the past years.”).  
 9.  For sovereign nations, the legal basis for the human right to water is derived from U.N. 
state membership and its Covenants, which provide the legal basis for many other human rights. 
As of 2016, there are currently 193 U.N. member states, which “[d]ue to the powers vested in its 
Charter and its unique international character, the United Nations can take action on the issues 
confronting humanity in the 21st century, such as peace and security, climate change, sustainable 
development, [and] human rights.” See About the U.N., UNITED NATIONS 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
 10.  The externalities surrounding the global water crisis are discussed infra, section III.A.  
 11.  The US Water Sector on the Verge of Transformation 7, ERNST & YOUNG  
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Cleantech_Water_Whitepaper/ 
$FILE/Cleantech-Water-Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) [hereinafter US Water Sector 
Transformation]. 
 12.  2030 WATER RESOURCES GROUP, CHARTING OUR WATER FUTURE: ECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORKS TO INFORM DECISION-MAKING at 19 (Mike D. Young and Christine Esau, 2009). 
 13.  Leila Boulton, Investing in Blue Gold, FIN. ADVISOR (Jan. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.fa-mag.com/news/investing-in-blue-gold-16511.html. 
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regimes that will ensure the accessibility and availability of water.14 
Although human rights advocates suggest that water is a social need 
and basic necessity of life, managing water from an economics 
perspective provides a more comprehensive approach. For example, 
an approach that incorporates economics has the capacity to recognize 
important variables, such as supply and demand, efficiency of use, 
avoiding waste, ecological considerations, and perhaps most 
importantly, transaction costs.15 Nevertheless, the following dilemma 
represents the riptide between the two competing paradigms, 
embracing the challenges that permeate the global water crisis: “While 
proponents of participation of the private sector argue that only the 
private sector can bring the desperately needed resources to the water 
sector, legitimate questions have been raised about the inevitable 
increases in tariffs that poor people cannot afford, and that, in turn, 
would threaten the concept of the human right to water.”16 
“The framing of water and sanitation as a human right can be 
understood as an affirmation of the fundamental importance of water 
and sanitation for human dignity,” as one scholar describes the 
dichotomy, and “as a response to global water service trends that have 
increasingly emphasized efficiency, financial sustainability, and 
privatization.”17 Although certainly reasonable, this sentiment is a 
 
 14.  Discussing the water policy relationship between the human rights based approach and 
economic management, one scholar described the various perspectives: “[t]his conflict as to 
whether water should be viewed as an economic good is not ineluctable but depends on the 
context and characteristics of local governance frameworks.” Tremblay, 51 NAT. RES. J. at 330, 
supra note 6; see also SALMAN M. A. SALMAN & SIOBHÁN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, WORLD 
BANK, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS 3 (2004), 
http://www.ais.unwater.org/ais/pluginfile.php/44/course/section/18/302290PAPER0Human0right
0to0H20.pdf (noting that “the current thinking is that water should not be viewed only as a social 
good and a human need, but also as a commodity”). 
 15.  See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD at 3–4, supra note 14 (“Striking a balance 
between the two considerations, particularly in light of the expanding role of the private sector in 
water resources management on the one hand, and the increasing recognition of the rights of the 
poor and vulnerable groups to water on the other, presents a major challenge.”). There are several 
distinct economic approaches to water management. For purposes of this discussion, the most 
fundamental economic approach “relies on the belief that the efficient allocation of water 
resources, measured in economic value, is maximized by markets,” where economic value is an 
“apportionment mechanism among different types of utilization and various users based on 
marginal costs and benefits.” Tremblay, supra note 6, at 330 –31. Another example, which is often 
a source of criticism when discussing economics and water, involves the “tarification of water” 
and is “based on accounting principles for costs recovery. . .to ensure sustainability.” Id. (citing 
AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RATES, FEES, AND CHARGES (5th ed., 2000)).   
 16.  SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 72–73; see also WORLD PANEL 
ON FIN. WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, FIN. WATER FOR ALL 3, WORLD WATER COUNCIL (2003).  
 17.  Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning, 
and the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 90 89 (2013).  
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matter of perception, one that does not explicitly analyze the global 
water challenge from an economic efficiency perspective, where 
neither party is made worse-off by the allocation of resources. By 
decoupling the broad strokes of “privatization” from a purely 
economic efficiency analysis, it becomes evident that private capital 
investment will help fulfill the human right to water while promoting 
scenarios where neither bargain party is harmed. In particular, an 
efficient outcome may be achieved through the development of 
infrastructure projects that ensure actual delivery of the water.18 
Perhaps the issue is not a comparison between “bad” and “good.” 
Instead, as water economist David Zetland describes, “[p]ublic or 
private water service providers fail because they are monopolies, not 
because of their profit structure.”19 
The distinctions between water, law, and economics are most 
apparent in the numerous attempts to reconcile the value of water. In 
The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith famously illustrated the different 
meanings of value: “The things which have the greatest value in use 
have frequently little or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary, 
those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little 
or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water; but it will 
purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for 
it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use . . . .”20 In 
contrast, water law scholars incorporate another distinction, and 
“categoriz[e] the intrinsic value of water as priceless or even 
 
 
 
 
 18.  This Article also assumes that distinctions can be drawn in uses of the term “efficiency,” 
such that efficient use of water does not mean economic efficiency for purposes of this Article. 
That would be too easy to argue that point, but my thoughts are the words have similarities, but 
for vastly different reasons, which will be examined in the Article.  
 19.  DAVID ZETLAND, THE END OF ABUNDANCE: ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS TO WATER 
SCARCITY 81 (2011). David Zetland is an assistant professor at Leiden University, Netherlands, 
where he teaches various classes on economics. He received his PhD in Agricultural and Resource 
Economics from University of California-Davis in 2008. He was a S.v. Ciriacy-Wantrup 
Postdoctoral Fellow in Natural Resource Economics and Political Economy at University of 
California-Berkeley (2008–2010). 
 20.  ADAM SMITH, Of the Origin and Use of Money, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 26, http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/NATIONS 
SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf (emphasis added); see also W.M. Hanemann, The Economic 
Conception of Water 62–63 in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds., 
2006) (quoting Smith’s “famous[ ] . . . paradox of water and diamonds”).  
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incalculable.”21 Whether examined from anthropocentric or ecocentric 
perspectives, the inherent value of water remains undeniable. 
By navigating around the traditional arguments concerning the 
economic “value” of water,22 the course of this Article—through the 
braided channels of law and economics23—seeks to harmonize 
concepts of the human right to water, as adopted in General Comment 
No. 15 by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, with opportunities for private investment in global 
hydrocommerce. In the study of ecology, the confluence of two rivers 
provides an apparent depiction of conflicting watercourses, much like 
the competing concepts of the human right to water and the economics 
of water. At least in a hydrological sense, these distinctions are 
recognizable, quantifiable, and often pastoral. This new watercourse, 
now incorporating the strength of both tributaries within its banks, is 
stronger and more productive than its respective tributaries. Here, 
through a perspective that integrates analyses rooted in law and 
economics, this Article seeks to take the first steps towards reconciling 
the human right to water and investment in global hydrocommerce. An 
economic analysis of the law provides a platform to use the economists’ 
approach to analyze functions of a particular legal system.24 On the 
premise that there exists a legal and moral obligation to deliver the 
human right to water, this discussion builds on legal scholarship, 
 
 21.  Gabriel Eckstein, Precious, Worthless, or Immeasurable: The Value and Ethic of Water, 
38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 963, 963 (2006). Because water is fundamental to human life, as Professor 
Eckstein argues, perhaps recognizing the “ethic of water” in relation to the “value of water” will 
facilitate cooperation among the multiple of perspectives:  
Water ethics reflect the relative importance water plays in people’s lives and provide guidance in 
decision making related to the use, management, allocation, and protection of freshwater 
resources . . . . One starting point in seeking universal water ethics, however, may be in the fact 
that all individuals, communities, nations, and societies value water.  
Id. at 968.  
 22.  Water invokes robust feelings, both practically, emotionally, and intellectually, among 
all classes of people from across the world. Further complicating the debate, renowned water 
scholar Peter Gleick suggests that water is characteristic of both renewable and non-renewable 
resources: “[w]ater is largely a renewable resource with rapid flows from one stock and form to 
another, and the human use of water typically has no effect on natural recharge rates. But there 
are also fixed or isolated stocks of local water resources that are being consumed at rates far faster 
than natural rates of renewal.” Peter H. Gleick & Meena Palaniappan, Peak Water Limits to 
Freshwater Withdrawal and Use, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11155, 11157 (2010).  
 23.  Some rivers have many small channels that continuously split and join, depending on 
different hydrological features, these are called “braided” channels. Similarly, the multi-
disciplinary approach utilized in this Article is similar to “braided” rivers, both in form, function, 
and interconnectivity.   
 24.  See R. H. Coase, Law and Economics and A.W. Brian Simpson, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 
103 (1996) (discussing the two separate, but overlapping, parts that comprise law and economics).  
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economic research, and basic common sense. Examining these global 
water challenges through the lens of economic efficiency and 
transaction costs promotes an avenue for reconciliation among all 
parties involved. First, by eroding the misperceptions that surround the 
alleged moral deficiencies, and second, by identifying an efficient 
equilibrium at the confluence of the apparently distinct tributaries of 
human rights and economic motivations. 
Reconciliation is the next step in arguing for the human right to 
water. From its theoretical origins to its pragmatic implementation, 
presenting a law and economics analysis supports private-sector 
participation in the delivery of water and funding necessary for 
adequate infrastructure. Section II details the law and economics 
discipline. Section III examines the global water crisis, while Section 
IV highlights the legal foundations of the human right to water. Section 
V addresses Coasean solutions and explores efficient outcomes. 
Finally, Section VI explores potential compatibility between the water 
justice movement and private-sector involvement.. 
II. THE CONFLUENCE OF LAW & ECONOMICS 
A.  Law & Economics 
The field of law and economics, arising from the logical coherence 
between these two doctrines, has evolved into an influential discipline 
throughout the United States.25 Legal scholarship no longer considers 
whether law and economics should be joined—this has already 
occurred—but rather, scholars now contemplate the breadth of the 
application of economics to the law and legal systems.26 The field of law 
and economics provides a platform for the application of economic 
analysis to legal issues. The Coase Theorem, recognizing the integral 
nature of transaction costs in an economic system, retains seminal 
importance within the discipline of law and economics.27 In addition, 
concepts of efficiency are employed, as well as an evaluation of the 
positive and negative externalities that are present in a given 
situation.28 
 
 25.  See Nuno Garoupa and Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and 
Economics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (2008) (noting that “[t]he 
U.S. legal academy has generously embraced law and economics”). Other “law and” movements 
include developments in the fields of law and philosophy, law and sociology, law and science, 
empirical legal studies, and feminist jurisprudence, among others. See id. at 1564–65.  
 26.  JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 5–6 (2008). 
 27.  See generally id. at 81–97. 
 28.  Id. at 59 (incorporating a narrow definition, “an externality occurs when one is harmed 
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Within the arena of legal scholarship in the United States, law and 
economics is among the fasting growing fields of study.29 From a global 
perspective, there is an increasing recognition of the importance of law 
and economics, yet this convergence has been at a much slower and 
more reserved pace than in the United States.30  Although the 
discipline has been accepted in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, legal 
scholars suggest that for various reasons, at least internationally, the 
influence of law and economics on legal policy and scholarship has 
been “overwhelmingly disappointing.”31 Scholars have put forward a 
myriad of hypotheses to explain the lack of success for law and 
economics outside the United States, including: legal tradition (e.g., 
civil law vs. common law);32 language barriers; misperceived influence 
of ideology (liberal or conservative) on legal philosophy within foreign 
legal scholarship;33 and perhaps the most comprehensive of all reasons, 
legal parochialism.34 
Hesitation throughout the international legal community to 
incorporate the field of law and economics simultaneously presents a 
 
or benefitted by the actions of another and there is no offsetting payment.”).   
 29.  Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1316–17 (2002) 
(noting that law and economics was one “of the external approaches that began to take hold in 
the legal academy around 1970”). 
 30.  Nuno Garoupa, The Law and Economics of Legal Parochialism, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1517, 1518 (2011) (noting that law and economics “is virtually ignored by courts” outside of the 
United States and Israel). 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and 
Developing Nations, 17 RATIO JURIS 66, 77 (2004) (asserting that common-law judges embrace 
law and economics in part because they are “appointed from the practice of law,” making them 
“more worldly than their counterparts in the career judiciaries of civilian legal systems.”); Richard 
A. Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in Europe, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
3, 4–5 (1997) (explaining cultural differences under continental Europe’s civil law system). 
 33.  Garoupa, supra note 30, at 1519–20. With particular regards to the topics discussed 
herein and the development of a harmonic balance between the legal right to water and economic 
analyses, Professor Garoupa’s historical analysis of law and economics in Europe offers 
interesting insight into these challenges.  
We should acknowledge that legal scholars in Europe show an intense dislike for efficiency and 
seem to be much more open to social justice or redistributive legal arguments. Chronologically, 
however, the distaste for efficiency seems to have been revealed when confronted with law and 
economics. Therefore, it is unclear whether law and economics has been rejected because legal 
scholars dislike efficiency, or efficiency is disliked because legal scholars rejected law and 
economics.  
Id. at 1520. Nevertheless, this underscores the potential significance of this  
Article, which provides an economic analysis in support of the legal right to water on a global 
scale.  
 34.  Id. at 1525 (defining legal parochialism as a “form of trade protectionism in the context 
of the market for legal ideas”).  
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unique opportunity for scholarship seeking to analyze foreign legal 
regimes from an economics perspective. The legal right to water 
continues to evolve as an international establishment, and because the 
field of law and economics has gained worldwide influence at a slower 
pace—this approach is among the first to both analyze and support the 
human right to water from an economics perspective. 
B.  The Coase Theorem & Transaction Costs 
The legacy of Professor Ronald Coase is embedded within his 
substantial contributions to the subject of law and economics,35 
including the concepts of transaction costs and associated limits of 
firms in The Nature of the Firm (1937).36 Coase famously established 
the notion that externalities could be overcome by well-defined 
property rights in The Problem of Social Cost (1960).37 Coase maintains 
his significance because of the pragmatic perspectives that are derived 
from his problem-solving approach and desire to identify efficient 
outcomes within the scope of real world challenges.38 The roots of his 
scholarship, at least chronologically, were influenced by an Economics 
of Public Utilities course that he was assigned to teach as an Assistant 
Lecturer at the London School of Economics in 1935. 
While researching “historical studies of the water, gas, and 
electricity supply industries,” Coase found that little was known about 
British public utilities.39  Most applicable to the discussion set forth 
herein, (which favors private-sector involvement in the delivery of the 
right to water, as opposed to countries that rely solely on the public 
sector) Coase described what he learned about water utilities: “These 
researches taught me much about the public utility industries and they 
 
 35.  See David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary 
Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990) (describing 
the Coase Theorem as the basis for virtually all law and economics theory).  
 36.  For much of his life and beginning in 1964, Ronald H. Coase was the Clifton R. Musser 
Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chicago Law School. Professor Coase was 
the editor of the Journal of Law and Economics from 1964–1982. He received the Alfred Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1991. See RONALD COASE INST., About Ronald Coase, 
https://coase.org/aboutronaldcoase.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).  
 37.  See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3. 
 38.  In describing his views on governmental involvement in the economy, Coase offered 
insight into his approach, which rather than being theoretical, was predominantly based on 
practical analyses: “[m]y views on government intervention in the economy have changed over 
my life, but they have always been driven by factual investigations.” Coase, Law and Economics 
and A.W. Brian Simpson, supra note 24, at 108.  
 39.  Id. at 106. This research was interrupted by World War II, when Coase joined the Civil 
Service. Id. at 106–07.  
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certainly made me aware of the defects of government operation of 
these industries, whether municipal or through nationalization.”40 
Although the extent to which these studies influenced his later 
scholarship is uncertain, the fact that his academic career began with 
research on water and other utilities suggests that Coase is relevant to 
a discussion concerning the obligation of governments to deliver the 
human right to water. 
The Coase Theorem is fundamental to any law and economics 
analysis, as The Problem of Social Cost is among the most cited articles 
within the discipline.41 Before the Coase Theorem became the 
formative doctrine among economists, Pigouvian taxes were the 
preferred remedy to restore efficiency and alleviate the effects of 
externalities.42 Coase’s argument fundamentally shifted the prevailing 
views among economists.43 The applicability of the Coase Theorem 
incorporates the nature of transaction costs.44 Transaction costs are 
those derived from the creation of the bargain. When there are no 
transaction costs, the Coase Theorem applies and the legal system in 
question necessarily achieves its desirable outcome. This outcome is an 
efficient equilibrium. The Coase Theorem advanced several significant 
notions with regards to the law and economics analysis: the application 
of Pigouvian taxes to remedy negative externalities does not always 
lead to an efficient result; the existence of externalities does not 
necessarily lead to an inefficient result; and most importantly, the focus 
should be on transaction costs, not necessarily externalities.45 
At its core, the Coase Theorem provides that the primary 
objective is to reach the most efficient allocation of resources (e.g., and 
for purposes of this article, access to water) with limited judicial and 
governmental involvement.46 Coase argued that as long as property 
rights are well defined and the parties enter a bargain without 
transaction costs, the market system will efficiently alleviate the effects 
 
 40.  Id. at 106. 
 41.  See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3. 
 42.  For an explanation of this methodology, see generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE (1932).  
 43.  See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3. 
 44.  See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12–13 (4th ed. 
2011) (explaining the Coase Theorem). 
 45.  HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 82; see also David Friedman, The Swedes 
Get It Right, http://daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/The_Swedes.html (last visited Sept. 17, 
2017). 
 46.  See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3, at 13 (“If we are to attain an optimum allocation of 
resources, it is therefore desirable that both parties should take the harmful effect (the nuisance) 
into account in deciding on their course of action.”).  
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of externalities.47 An efficient outcome, and thus an efficient allocation 
of resources, requires that the transaction costs be less than the benefits 
each party will receive.48 From a Coasean perspective, these 
transaction costs must be low (or at zero) to incentivize activity and 
achieve an economically efficient right allocation.49 Otherwise, when 
transaction costs are too high, parties may never achieve “this optimal 
arrangement of rights.”50 
The Coase Theorem, and its concept of transaction costs, is 
relevant to the discussion concerning whether an efficient equilibrium 
can be achieved by including the private sector in facilitating the 
delivery of the human right to water. According to some legal scholars, 
the reality is that transaction costs are almost never zero and are often 
substantial.51 As discussed infra in Section V, various transaction costs 
and externalities exist among the private sector, governments, and 
individuals within the global hydrocommerce arena. Determinations 
regarding the applicability of the Coase Theorem must be considered 
on a case-by-case basis. To address these complexities, this Article will 
consider the risks, incentives, and reduction of externalities, both in the 
case of private-sector involvement and without, to examine various 
approaches (and their alternatives) that can lead to an economically 
efficient allocation of resources. 
C.  Principles of Economic Efficiency 
In an efficient economic system, goods worth more than they cost 
to produce get produced, while goods worth less than they cost to 
produce do not.52 Externalities and their associated effects complicate 
the system, leading to inefficient outcomes and limited production. As 
the original baseline standard of efficiency, Pareto efficiency is often 
incorporated into the law and economics analysis.53 At its core, Pareto 
efficiency examines various allocations of resources and the 
 
 47.  See Friedman, supra note 45 (“If transaction costs are zero—if in other words, any 
agreement that is to the mutual benefit of the parties concerned gets made—then any initial 
definition of property rights leads to an efficient outcome.”).  
 48.  See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3, at 15 (explaining that, even if transactions are 
costless, rights will be rearranged “if it would lead to an increase in the value of production”).  
 49.  Id. at 15–16. 
 50.  Id. at 16. 
 51.  HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 98; see also Friedman, supra note 45. 
 52.  HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 82. 
 53.  The Pareto concept of economic efficiency is credited to Italian economist and engineer 
Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923). SEAN INGHAM, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, PARETO-OPTIMALITY, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pareto-optimality (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).  
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corresponding societal impact if those allocations are altered. When an 
alteration can be made that makes at least one person better off and 
no person worse off, then this efficient outcome is Pareto superior.54 In 
contrast, an alteration that leaves at least one person worse off is Pareto 
inferior, disregarding any beneficial effects to other parties.55 An 
allocation is considered Pareto efficient or optimal when no change can 
be made without making at least one person worse off.56 
Pareto efficiency is important because these benefits or detriments 
are not weighed against each other. It is difficult to orchestrate legal or 
policy regimes with universal agreement—where all parties benefit and 
none are disadvantaged. Although some scholars have suggested that 
the standard of Pareto efficiency is confined to certain situations and 
limited in its applicability,57  this Article’s analysis is significant because 
it may broaden the scope of this applicability, such that Pareto 
efficiency may be apparent within the relationship between the human 
right to water and global hydrocommerce. Multiple parties will be 
evaluated in the subsequent economic analysis, which evaluates legal 
regimes that create an obligation for states to seek private-sector 
involvement to ensure the provision of the human right to water for its 
citizens. For the sake of this macro-level analysis, the relevant parties 
include individuals receiving the right to water, governments with an 
obligation to provide this right to water to the citizens of the state, and 
private-sector investors seeking to profit within the lucrative global 
market. 
One alternative to the efficiency considered within the purview of 
the Coase Theorem is the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which is essentially 
a standard of wealth maximization.58 This concept of efficiency is often 
relied upon by economists in analyzing legal regimes from an economic 
perspective.59 In terms of wealth maximization, the Kaldor-Hicks 
standard of efficiency ensures that resources end up in the possession 
of those who value the resources most, irrespective of the voluntary 
exchange of compensation. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is different than 
Pareto efficiency because Pareto efficiency concepts rely on 
“interpersonal comparisons of utility,” which may be unscientific and 
 
 54.  HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 27  
 55. Id. 
 56.  HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 26–27; see also POLINSKY, supra note 44, at 
7–9. 
 57.  HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 28–29.  
 58.  Id. at 28. 
 59.  Id.  
Miller Final (Do Not Delete) 2/15/2018  5:31 PM 
Fall 2017] HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 121  
arbitrary in comparison to units of “wealth” and “value.”60 Economists 
realized utility comparisons among buyers and sellers is quantitatively 
impractical because utility refers to the psychological satisfaction of the 
parties. In contrast, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency provided an acceptable 
substitute because wealth maximization is expressed as a “willingness 
or ability to pay.”61 This concept is imperfect, particularly in its 
applicability to the right to water as a legal regime, because a 
consequence of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is that “those who cannot pay 
for something, even though they might derive great utility from it, will 
not be regarded as valuing it.”62 
Externalities must also be examined, particularly in situations 
where the Coase Thereom may lack applicability. An externality 
occurs when one is harmed or benefited by the actions of another and 
there is no offsetting payment.63 For example, air and water pollution 
are externalities that result from market failure. No party can offer it 
for sale, and no corresponding party can acquire it for production 
purposes.64 The scope of externalities can affect individuals by reducing 
their respective utility in a way beyond their control, as well as firms, 
by affecting production in a positive or negative manner.65 When only 
two parties are involved, it is likely easier to achieve a solution that 
addresses the externalities. In contrast, when numerous individuals, 
nations, and private-sector representatives are involved—as is the case 
with legal regimes that provide the right to water—it becomes 
exponentially more challenging to address the prevailing externalities. 
The applicability of these law and economics concepts, namely 
Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and externalities, are 
essential to the analysis. They address whether the most efficient 
regime in the provision of the right to water is through private-sector 
involvement or if alternatives should also be considered from a law and 
economics perspective. 
D.  Water Law & Economics 
The application of economic analyses within the realm of water 
law jurisprudence has garnered increasing recognition among legal 
 
 60.  Id. at 29–30.  
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id. at 31. 
 63.  Id. at 59. 
 64.  See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 446 (2002) (describing 
pollution as an example of a negative externality).  
 65.  HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 64–65.  
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scholars and law review publications in the United States.66 Building on 
this scholarship, this Article is unique in its application of economics 
analyses to internationally recognized human rights, rather than a 
national (i.e., domestic) legal regime.67 Water management 
institutions, such as the Integrated Water Resources Management, 
often reference economic efficiency as a relevant factor within 
successful regimes. Much of the legal scholarship, however, focuses on 
supply and demand, waste, and the economic “value” of water. Most 
importantly, there has been limited scholarship that applies the 
economic concepts of efficiency (i.e., Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks) “the 
human rights to water.” 
In American legal scholarship, economic principles intersect with 
concepts of water law primarily in the water markets discussion. Within 
the market system, voluntary transfers would occur between willing 
sellers and buyers who decide what the water is worth to each of them.68 
From an economics perspective, embracing the market system would 
“facilitate the movement of water from low-value activities to higher 
value ones,” thereby promoting efficiency by decreasing waste.69 
Nevertheless, although the potential benefits of water markets may be 
significant in various regions and circumstances, this approach may not 
fully address the underlying global water crisis. How can an individual 
who lacks basic access to water begin to bargain or negotiate with 
 
 66.  See Aaron Culp, Comment, Water Can Be for Drinking Again: Economic and 
Collaborative Solutions to a Texas Water Fight, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 103, 110–13 (using economic 
analyses including the Coase Theorem, as well as Calabresi and Melamed’s “Cathedral” model, 
to examine a water rights conflict in Texas between downstream rice farmers and upstream 
domestic water users in the Highland Lakes Region and City of Austin). See also Guido Calbresi 
& Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1107 (1972) (exploring transaction cost issues derived from 
“holdouts”). For an application of Coasean principles to water law, see generally Sarah P. 
Hollinshead, Water Is Not Liquid: Securitization, Transaction Costs, and California’s Water 
Market, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323 (2008), and  C. Carter Ruml, The Coase Theorem and 
Western U.S. Appropriative Water Rights, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 169 (2005). Ruml analyzed the 
legal and pragmatic obstacles to water transfers to demonstrate that the prior appropriation 
regime did not achieve the Coase equilibria because “transaction costs [were] high and title to 
water rights [was] insecure.” Id. at 182. 
 67.  Although law review articles have explored, or at least acknowledged, the interactions 
between economic efficiency and the right to water, see, e.g., Tremblay, supra note 6, at 309, none 
have offered a thorough examination of these symbiotic contradictions from an economics and 
the law perspective.  
 68.  See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 
1884 (2005); see also Robert Glennon, The Price of Water, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 
337, 339 (2004) (exploring “the voluntary transfer of water between water users” as a potential 
option for addressing our increasing use of water).  
 69.  Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, supra note 68, at 1884.  
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another party within a water market transaction? Moreover, what is 
the value of water if your country lacks the basic distribution systems 
and infrastructure to even deliver this resource? 
III. THE WORLD’S MOST “FUNDAMENTAL” RESOURCE 
A.  Global Water Crisis 
Throughout the history of mankind, the importance of water has 
remained constant because there is simply no substitute for water. 
More importantly, water is a “prerequisite for the realization of other 
human rights.”70 Despite the essential nature of this resource, “more 
than [two] billion people are affected by water shortages in over forty 
countries.”71 1.1 billion people do not have sufficient access to clean 
and safe water, while 2.6 billion people have no provisions for 
sanitation.72 These proportions are staggering in a world of almost 7.5 
billion individuals. Even more alarming, an estimated 1.4 million 
children under the age of five die every year due to lack of clean water 
and adequate sanitation.73 For instance, in the African countries of 
Nigeria and Cameroon, the increased use of unprotected water sources 
for drinking purposes is directly associated with an increase child 
mortality rates.74 
Renowned scientist Peter Gleick describes the failure to provide 
individuals with affordable and reliable access to clean water and 
sanitation as one of humankind’s greatest failings.78 These statistics are 
exacerbated by the increasing global population, which has more than 
tripled in the last century. This corresponds with an increasing demand 
 
 70.  General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 1. 
 71.  SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 1. 
 72.  Michael D. Young, Investing in Water Services Infrastructure Polices and Management 
3, in INVESTING IN WATER FOR A GREEN ECONOMY: SERVICES, INFRASTRUCTURE, POLICIES, 
AND MANAGEMENT (Mike D. Young & Christine Esau eds., 2013); see also FREDRIK 
SEGERFELDT, WATER FOR SALE: HOW BUSINESS AND THE MARKET CAN RESOLVE THE 
WORLD’S WATER CRISIS 1, CATO INST. (2005); UN-Water Global Annual Assessment of 
Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS) 2010: Targeting Resources for Better Results, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2010), www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/glaas/en/ (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2017).  
 73.  Young, supra note 72, at 3, 9.  At this rate, an estimated 3,900 children under 5 years old 
die per day because of lack of access to clean water and sanitation. Id. at 9; see also UNICEF, 
STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2005 (2004).  
 74.  See John Ward et al., Challenging Hydrological Panaceas: Evidence from the Niger River 
Basin at 177, in INVESTING IN WATER FOR A GREEN ECONOMY: SERVICES, INFRASTRUCTURE, 
POLICIES, AND MANAGEMENT (Mike D. Young & Christine Esau eds., 2013). 
78 See PETER H. GLEICK, THE WORLD’S WATER 2008–2009: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON 
FRESHWATER RESOURCES (2009).  
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for water, further straining the finite supply of this natural resource. 
Throughout this same timeframe, water uses for human purposes have 
multiplied at a six-fold rate.75 The gravity of these adverse impacts is 
resounding, with widespread implications for countries and their 
citizens. 
Although  the difficulty in providing individuals with clean water 
and sanitation exists in various degrees—each uniquely affected at 
regional-levels by socio-economics, aridity, development, and climate, 
among other factors76—the inability to ensure the provision of water 
occurs throughout the world. Many countries have failed to provide 
even the most basic water industry services. In fact, most countries in 
Africa, large areas of central Asia, and countries such as China, India, 
Peru, and Bolivia cannot provide many of  their citizens with access to 
clean water or sanitation.77 According to Australian water economist 
Michael D. Young, “[t]he existing inadequacies in provision of water 
and sanitation services generate considerable social costs and 
economic inefficiencies.”78 The various perspectives on water, in 
connection with the increasing global population and demand for 
freshwater, creates an intricate mosaic of tensions concerning the 
availability, accessibility, provision, and protection of this fundamental 
natural resource.79 
1.  Government Failure and Inefficiency in the Delivery of Water 
Water scarcity—an individual’s lack of access to clean water—
arises due to economic and physical constraints, while being influenced 
by managerial, institutional, and political factors.80 The primary 
 
 75.  SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 1 (citing WILLIAM J. COSGROVE 
& FRANK R. RIJSBERMAN, WORLD WATER COUNCIL, WORLD WATER VISION—MAKING 
WATER EVERYBODY’S BUSINESS 4 (Earthscan Publications Ltd. 2000)).  
 76.  See, e.g., Arab Water Council, Vulnerability of Arid and Semi-Arid Regions to Climate 
Change, PERSPECTIVES ON WATER AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION, 
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Library/Publications_and_reports/Climate_Ch
ange/PersPap_09._Arid_and_Semi-Arid_Regions.pdf. (last visited Sept. 28, 2017). 
 77.  See Charles J. Vorosmarty et al., Global Threats to Human Water Security and River 
Biodiversity, 467 NATURE 555, 556–61 (2010) (quantifying stressors affecting surface water 
resources and analyzing policy and management responses to water security and biodiversity 
threats over a range of scales, “from global to local”); see generally JOINT MONITORING 
PROGRAMME ON WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION, WORLD HEALTH ORG./UNICEF, 
PROGRESS ON SANITATION AND DRINKING-WATER: 2010 UPDATE (2010).  
 78.  Young, supra note 72, at 3.   
 79.  See generally Eckstein, supra note 21, at 964.   
 80.  See Ward et al., supra note 74, at 177–78; see also Francois Molle & Peter Mollinga, 
Water Policy Indicators: Conceptual Problems and Policy Issues, 5 WATER POLICY 529, 531 
(2003).  
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challenge faced by states concerning their respective water distribution 
schemes is a lack of adequate financial resources. In developing 
countries, an estimated ninety-seven percent of all water distribution is 
managed by public-sector suppliers.81 In these same developing 
countries, more than a billion individuals are deprived of access to 
water.82 The realities concerning these water distribution systems in 
developing countries, and the fact that over a billion people still lack 
access to this resource, suggests that governments retain at least some 
responsibility in the persistence of the global water crisis. 
Multiple externalities permeate water utilities that are controlled 
and operated by the public sector (i.e., government 
management/funding regimes). These externalities may come from the 
motivations of politicians and trade unions, which are often driven by 
self-interest as opposed to the greater welfare of society. The problem 
with these individual government-actors may actually be a lack of 
motivation, at least in terms of ensuring the delivery of water to 
citizens. These systems often become inefficient, as the bureaucracies 
preserve the failing status quo. Government utilities in developing 
countries must deal with intermittent power supplies, lack of 
regulations, poorly educated staff, and bureaucratic demands, leading 
to an environment of complacency and corruption.83 In comparison, 
the private sector maintains different motivations, benefitting from a 
range of factors, including more robust financial resources, specialized 
expertise in water distribution, experience with corporate operations, 
access to innovative technology, cost-awareness, and incentive-based 
structures.84 The billions of people lacking access to water suggests that 
public-sector utilities are not often successful in the provision of water, 
at least not in a capacity that features sole management authority. 
Further, the frequency of these critical circumstances is indicative of a 
prevailing trend where the public sector lacks the requisite financial 
resources to efficiently manage their water distribution systems. 
Governments are affected by numerous other factors. Public-
sector utilities may be operating in serious debt, overstaffed by 
politically connected individuals, and understaffed by individuals that 
have the appropriate expertise. The public sector operational structure 
often relies on bureaucrats, while placing too little emphasis on 
engineers, economists, and hydrologists. Political concerns are 
 
 81.  SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 1.  
 82.  Id. 
 83.  ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 155.  
 84.  See SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 59–62.  
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pervasive in the public sector, which can result in monopoly-type 
regimes that inevitably fail.85 These inefficiencies lead to coverage 
issues for citizens, in which government utilities cannot supply water to 
its whole distribution network throughout the entire twenty-four hour 
day. For example, before the Philippine government privatized its 
water sector, the government agency could only supply water for 
seventeen hours per day, and even this was limited to two-thirds of the 
utilities coverage.86 
Despite the alarming nature of these statistics regarding public-
sector failures in the water industry, this should not be considered a 
reason to presume that private-sector participation in water delivery 
and infrastructure is an automatic, fail-safe solution. It is true that the 
private sector participation in this complex industry has also 
contributed to the failure of certain water delivery regimes. 
Nevertheless, as this Article contemplates through the law and 
economics analysis, this suggests that we must examine the current 
status of global water delivery regimes and acknowledge that the public 
sector may not be best suited to handle these responsibilities, at least 
not as sole management authority in some situations. 
2.  Private-Sector Participation in Water Distribution Regimes 
By the 1990s, the breadth of the global water crisis led many 
governments in developing countries to seek private-sector 
participation in more than 100 water and sewerage projects.87 Although 
the degree of participation may be considered controversial (e.g., 
complete privatization vs. public-private partnerships), there is 
optimism throughout the global water industry that private-sector 
 
 85.  ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 88–90.  
 86.  See Tanya Kapoor, Is Successful Water Privatization a Pipe Dream?: An Analysis of 
Three Global Case Studies, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 157, 178–79 (2015).  
 87.  See George R.G. Clarke, Katrina Kosec & Scott Wallsten, Has Private Participation in 
Water and Sewerage Improved Coverage? Empirical Evidence From Latin America, 21 J. INT’L. 
DEV. 327, 328 (2009). According to some international commentators, concepts of efficiency were 
central to the private sector’s increased involvement in the development of services and 
infrastructure:  
In the 1980s, the neoliberal agenda shifted the focus of development efforts from economic 
growth with equity towards efficiency and the productive allocation of resources. Around this 
time, private sector participation in previously state run enterprises. . .was particularly 
encouraged. Essentially, a ‘tidal wave of privatization’ was unleashed with private actors taking 
over the delivery of services related to social welfare, health care, water, gas, electricity, and so 
on. 
Anna F.S. Russell, Incorporating Social Rights in Development: Transnational Corporations and 
the Right to Water, 7 INT’L. J. L. IN CONT. 1, 1 (2011).  
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involvement will maintain a significant role in the delivery of water and 
development of adequate infrastructure. Participation by the private 
sector within the realm of the global water industry has encountered 
both successes and failures.88 However, many case studies, 
commentaries, and media coverage focus on the most extreme 
examples.89 More generally, the comparison of water-utility 
performances before and after privatization does not address whether 
the result would have been different in the absence of such 
privatization reforms.90 It is difficult to make these estimates with 
certainty, at least from a quantitative perspective. Thus, some 
researchers suggest that empirical deficiencies may reside within case 
studies comparing successes and failures.91 
Although the private sector has experienced failures in the water 
industry, there are also many successful examples of private 
investments that improve water distribution in developing countries. 
Most notably, in the Philippines, after the private sector obtained 
management control of the water distribution system in Manila, the 
results were the delivery of water to millions of citizens that were not 
previously served by the public, government-controlled utility.92 The 
Manila Water Company has served residents for over fifteen years and 
is now listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange.93 By 2006, ninety-nine 
percent of Manila Water Company’s distribution network had twenty-
four hour access to water.94 Even when rates increased, the private 
sector instituted programs to ensure that residents in the poorest 
neighborhoods paid below the price charged to other customers.95 
Although there are many examples of private-sector participation, 
media sensationalism suggests that news coverage will focus on the 
most controversial and disastrous events. Thus, the press is more likely 
to cover events similar to the protests in Cochabamba, Bolivia, after 
the water concession contract was revoked, rather than a moderately 
 
 88.  See Clarke et al., supra note 87, at 328. ] 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. at 328–30. 
 91.  Id. at 328. 
 92.  See SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 2; see also Xun Wu & Nepomuceno A. Malaluan, A 
Tale of Two Concessionaires: A Natural Experiment of Water Privatization in Metro Manila, 45 
URB. STUD. 207, 213–17 (2008).  
 93.  See Kapoor, supra note 86, at 178. In the year of its IPO (2005), Asia Money voted 
Manila Water Company the “best managed small cap company.” See id. at n.262.  
 94.  See id. at 181.  
 95.  See id. at 183. 
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successful example of private-sector participation.96 Some 
commentators suggest that empirical studies of the success of private-
sector participation may also retain this sample selection bias.97 Many 
critiques of private-sector involvement focus on absolute privatization 
regimes, rather than capital investments in local or regional water 
infrastructure projects. For example, one commentator suggests that 
“water privatization programs are highly unlikely to deliver Pareto 
improvements if privatizers charge impoverished and wealthy 
populations the prevailing market rate,” instead proposing that they 
should allow progressive pricing.98 The resulting negotiations and 
transaction costs will almost certainly be different if the private 
company is seeking full privatization of the water industry through 
concession contracts, as opposed to investments in water infrastructure 
projects and similar management contracts. 
In general, it is true that all types of water services regimes have 
been met with varying degrees of success and failure.99 For purposes of 
this Article, it is important to consider that the various types and 
degrees of private-sector participation may affect water distribution 
systems and coverage differently. For example, concession contracts 
represent absolute privatization and may invite substantial private 
investment.100 Lease and management contracts also invite private-
sector investment.101 In some instances, loans from international 
donors such as the World Bank provided the financial resources to 
expand the water sector; commentators suggest that due to the poor 
performance of public utilities, countries would not have received the 
 
 96.  See infra Section IV for more thorough discussion on the events in Cochabamba, Bolivia 
and the implications for future private-sector involvement. In summary, Bolivia allowed private 
sector participation in the water and sewerage sectors. In 1999, the Cochabamba government 
signed a 40-year concession agreement, but after higher tariffs resulted in civil unrest, the 
agreement was cancelled five months later. Id. at 340.  
 97.  See Clarke et al., supra note 87, at 328–29.  
 98.  Kapoor, supra note 86, at 159–60 (critiquing “development banks’ privatization policies 
by analyzing water privatizations in Bolivia, South Africa, and the Philippines”). 
 99.  The three general types of water service utilities include the public sector, the private 
sector, and public-private partnerships. ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 86–98. 
 100.  Concession contracts “give private company a license to run the water system and charge 
customers to make a profit. The private company is responsible for all investments, including 
building new pipes and sewers to connect households.” MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARK, BLUE 
GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 39 (2002). 
 101.  Leases are “contracts under which the company is responsible for running the 
distribution system and for making the investments necessary to repair and renew the existing 
assets, but the local government remains responsible for new investment.” Management contracts 
“make the private company responsible only for managing the water service but not for any 
investments.” Id. at 39. 
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financing without private-sector participation.102 Although a detailed 
analysis of these levels of involvement may be an entirely different 
discussion, the overarching approach should be to examine effects on 
a case-by-case basis, rather than making general assumptions. 
B.  Blue Gold: Investment in the Global Water Industry 
The business of water, particularly investment opportunities 
within the realm of water distribution, is linked to infrastructure gaps, 
treatment methodologies, water industry sectors, regulatory 
requirements, and the practical needs for emerging countries, among 
many other sub-disciplines and related sectors.103 The costs associated 
with the provision of clean water are inextricably linked to these same 
factors. Resource economist Steve Hoffman best described the 
prospects of entering the global water industry from an investor’s 
perspective, “Any time there is a structural change in an industry 
caused by shifts in the economic fundamentals, there is a huge potential 
for corresponding economic gain…creat[ing] the unprecedented 
investment opportunity of the twenty-first century—the business of 
water.”104 This remarkable statistic broadly represents the cost of 
providing access to water and adequate sanitation, either through 
construction of new infrastructure or to maintain existing water 
delivery services. 
Even in developed countries, the costs to operate, maintain, 
monitor, and replace existing infrastructure are quite staggering, 
annually approaching hundreds of billions of dollars (USD). Reports 
also suggest that only three percent of impoverished citizens in the 
developing world are provided water by private-sector utilities.105 
Among these developing countries, private-sector participation in 
water distribution has been limited. This presents a host of challenges 
and opportunities: At least $180 billion is required annually to ensure 
the universal delivery of water to citizens of the Third World.106 
Because water utilities directly provide water to the user, they play a 
substantial role in ensuring an individual’s human right to water. 
 
 102.  Clarke et al., supra note 87, at 334–35. Countries that received World Bank financed 
loans for water sector projects include Guinea and Colombia (specifically the city of Cartagena) 
Id. at 8. 
 103.  Id. at 41.  
 104.  STEVE HOFFMAN, PLANET WATER: INVESTING IN THE WORLD’S MOST VALUABLE 
RESOURCE 49 (2009).  
 105.  SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 2–4.  
 106.  Id. 
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Although the business of water remains integrated as a whole, the 
industry can be characterized by various sectors including: water 
utilities, infrastructure, treatment, and resource management. Despite 
differences concerning their respective investment characteristics, each 
sector is immediately relevant to the delivery of the resource, and 
equally relevant to fulfilling the right to water in terms of accessibility, 
availability, quantity, and quality. The water infrastructure sector 
constructs, replaces, repairs, and monitors the water distribution 
systems, including vast networks of pipelines, pumps, storage facilities, 
and other mechanisms in the system.107  The nature of water 
distribution provides strategic investment opportunities: 
“[i]nternational markets for new infrastructure construction in 
emerging economies add significantly to the magnitude of the potential 
expenditures.”108 The water and wastewater treatment sector also 
provides opportunities for investors intrigued by technological 
developments in the use, reuse, or discharge of water, processes which 
could include equipment, chemicals, filtration, or disinfection. 
Desalination is another exciting investment technology, a technique 
that has experienced significant growth over the last decade.109 
Management efforts traditionally focused on increasing water 
supplies and access to these supplies, allowing private capital 
investments for the construction of dams and impoundments, as well 
as other large-scale infrastructure projects.110 Nevertheless, the 
demand for water continues to increase, intensified by urbanization, 
agricultural development, industrial development, climate change, and 
pollution.111 These factors have further created investment 
opportunities within global water management, so scarcity concerns 
 
 107. HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 57. 
 108. Id. In the United States, the EPA estimates that the total costs to repair the existing 
water and wastewater infrastructure will approach $1 trillion over the next several decades. Id.  
 109.  See Isabel Kershner, Aided by the Sea, Israel Overcomes an Old Foe: Drought, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/world/middleeast/water-revolution-
in-israel-overcomes-any-threat-of-drought.html?_r=0.  
 110.  See Murthy, supra note 17, at 95. Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project (“GAP”), a 
development project to build a series of dams and hydroelectric plants along the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers in the southeastern part of Turkey. The project will take 30 years to complete 
and is estimated to cost $32 billion. This project is expected to assist the economic and socio-
cultural development of the region. However, aside from the transnational complications in a 
region lacking long-term stability, there are questions regarding whether Turkey can provide the 
necessary initial investments in order to procure the long-term benefits. See, e.g., Ali Unal, Turkey 
Will Invest $10 Billion in Southeastern Anatolia Project, DAILY SABAH (Mar. 8, 2015), 
https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2015/03/08/turkey-will-invest-10-billion-in-southeastern-
anatolia-project. 
 111.  See Murthy, supra note 17, at 95.   
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are met with technological solutions designed to reduce waste and 
improve efficiency.112 
The total cost of providing access to clean water is staggering, even 
when the initial costs are spread out over the course of several decades. 
According to most commentators, these total cost figures are dynamic, 
for the magnitude of the water industry “is simply too extensive to be 
viewed in a composite manner.”113 In the Infrastructure to 2030 report, 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) estimates that the average annual costs for global water 
infrastructure and water-related services will approach $1.04 trillion 
(USD) by 2025.114 Yet, the enormity of this total only includes the 
cumulative estimated costs of clean water for the twenty OECD 
member countries, combined with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the 
“BRIC countries”), and between the years 2008–2025.115 On a global 
scale, this total is much higher, for the annual $1.04 trillion in projected 
expenditures does not include the project costs among non-OECD 
countries. Thus, many developing countries that are most severely in 
need of clean water and many regions of Latin America, South 
America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are excluded from the 
calculation.116 Within the realm of transaction costs, many of these 
estimates do not even account for issues such as water scarcity, 
regulatory developments, sustainability regimes (i.e., IWRM), 
financing costs, and accumulating shortfall deficits.117 Developing 
countries must also consider many of these same transaction costs, as 
well as additional concerns over obtaining new water supplies and 
constructing adequate distribution/storage systems. 
1.  Financing Water Infrastructure Projects 
In order to finance infrastructure projects, various funding 
mechanisms will benefit from investors that recognize the advantages 
associated with private-sector participation in the global water 
industry. Water-related investments have traditionally focused on  
 
 
 112.  BARLOW & CLARK, supra note 100, at 73–85 (describing desalination, nanotechnology, 
and other emerging technologies).  
 113.  HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 42. Clean water refers to all related activities within the 
full spectrum of water, wastewater, storm water, and recycled water. 
 114.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., INFRASTRUCTURE TO 2030: TELECOM, 
LAND TRANSPORT, WATER AND ELECTRICITY 313–14 (2006) (Table 5.16). 
 115.  Id. at 313–14. 
 116.  HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 42–43.  
 117.  Id. at 44–45.  
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equities, which provide the most straightforward vehicle to realize 
gains associated with the fundamentals of the industry.118 
Growth in the private equity market may be particularly 
compatible with large-scale water infrastructure projects. “Private 
equity is an important potential source of capital for the water sector 
that could drive consolidation, efficiency and new investments in 
technology and infrastructure.”119 In general, private equity funds are 
a collection of investors who can commit large sums of money for long 
periods of time.120 As the general partner, the investment manager will 
seek high net worth individuals and institutional investors as limited 
partners to invest directly into private companies or pursue buyouts of 
public companies. Capital is then used to fund new technologies, 
pursue acquisitions, or augment the company’s balance sheet. Most 
importantly, because private equity investments have long holding 
periods, investors are not seeking immediate returns, meaning that 
time-consuming infrastructure projects will retain the requisite capital 
throughout their duration. Investors that plan to maintain a certain 
infrastructure investment over the course of twenty years, subjecting 
themselves to substantial stakeholder scrutiny, are much more likely to 
invest in companies that have not “cut corners.” 
The private sector may play a serious role because the lifecycle 
costs to construct, maintain, and operate infrastructure services are 
primarily capital costs. Within the international water sector, 
expanding access to water is a  potentially robust investment that also 
ensures that people receive their right to water. On a global scale, 
leading private investment firms have platforms to investment capital 
in growth markets, including the diverse water sectors. Aqua 
International Partners, L.P., a private equity fund of TPG Capital, 
focused on investing in specialized companies providing water and 
water-related products to emerging market economies.121 Recently, 
Blackstone Energy Partners, another leading investment firm, 
 
 118.  HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 293.  
 119.  US Water Sector Transformation, supra note 11, at 9.  
 120.  Private Equity, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ 
privateequity.asp?ad=dirN&qo=investopediaSiteSearch&qsrc=0&o=40186 (last visited Mar. 16, 
2016). 
 121.  Company Overview of Aqua International Partners, BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=18839. William K. 
Reilly was the Founding Partner of Aqua International. He previously served as Administrator 
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1989–1993) and president of the World Wildlife 
Fund (1985–1989). The investment firm TPG now has over $70 billion under management, having 
invested in approximately 300 companies.  
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announced the creation of Global Water Development Partners, a 
company designed to “support companies with critically-needed 
capital to create long-term and sustainable water facilities…and to 
identify, develop, finance, construct, and operate large scale 
independent water development projects globally.”122 Estimates 
suggest a majority of current funding for all types of infrastructure 
projects comes from public sources, primarily debt investment from 
state-owned development banks.123 
Institutional investors have also begun to find attractive deals 
investing in water infrastructure projects.124 In recognition of the 
extensive time required to complete infrastructure projects, these long-
term assets are paired with institutional investors, including the long-
term liabilities of insurance companies, reinsurers, pension funds, and 
sovereign wealth funds. Although institutional investors in the U.S., 
like the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(“CalPERS”), have expanded their strategies to include water 
investments, “they’re still far behind their peers in Australia and 
Europe, where water infrastructure has been a mainstay of portfolios 
for decades.”125 The World Bank noted that on a global scale 
“infrastructure re-emerged as a popular, nearly consensus solution to 
the economic and societal woes of developing countries and 
industrialized nations alike.”126 Describing the potential opportunities 
for investment in the water market, one investment manager 
characterized the status of water infrastructure investments as being 
“in the first inning of what is going to be an 11-inning Yankees-Red 
Sox game.”127 
 
 122.  Press Release, Blackstone, Blackstone Energy Partners Establishes Global Water 
Development Platform (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.blackstone.com/media/press-
releases/article/blackstone-energy-partners-establishes-global-water-development-platform. As 
a global leader in growth equity, real estate investments, hedge funds, and a diverse credit 
portfolio, The Blackstone Group claims an estimated $336 billion (USD) assets under 
management as of Dec. 31, 2015.  The Firm, BLACKSTONE, http://www.blackstone.com/the-
firm/overview (last visited Sept. 28, 2017).  
 123.  Jordan Z. Schwartz, Institutional Investment in Infrastructure: A View from the Bridge of 
a Development Agency, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 16, 2015), 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/institutional-investment-infrastructure-view-bridge-
development-agency. 
 124. Kaitlin Ugolik, Investors Finally Tap Into U.S. Water Market, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
(June 24, 2015), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3464966/investors-
pensions/investors-finally-tap-into-us-water-market.html#.WcMsdtOGMWo. 
 125.  Id.  
 126.  See Schwartz, supra note 123 (estimating that less than fifteen percent of all types of 
infrastructure investment actually involve some form of private participation).  
 127.  Ugolik, supra note 124.  
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From a specialized standpoint, other firms are integrating 
specialized water investment strategies. Summit Global Management, 
a registered investment adviser with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, invests directly into water-related equities and physical 
water assets, through both managed accounts and private investment 
partnerships.128 In the decentralized water system of the U.S., an 
estimated 90% of the water-utilities are government-owned.129 The 
water sector traditionally raised capital through municipal bonds.130 
However, many U.S. water utilities have sought greater access to 
private capital to withstand the shortfalls in public financing.131 
Through innovative financing options such as financing from 
infrastructure equity funds, the water sector seeks to “expand the 
number of market participants and types of securities beyond the 
municipal bond market and to improve the awareness and 
attractiveness of water infrastructure projects for new private 
investors.”132 
Despite the breadth of the municipal bond market, including both 
general obligation and revenue bonds, some commentators suggest 
that many water investors continue to overlook this asset class.133 At 
some point during or after the infrastructure project, governments 
must repay these financing costs. General obligation bonds are issued 
with governmental authority that provides the power to levy taxes for 
the repayment of the bonds. Revenue bonds are issued to finance 
particular projects that will generate rates (i.e., income) to repay the 
bonds. Depending on the circumstances of the given locality, there are 
various options for pursuing water-related development or expansion 
projects. 
Consider the following remarks by natural resource economist Dr. 
David B. Brooks in a publication analyzing water management 
regimes. The sentiment underscores both the market potential for 
investors, along with the alarming realities that permeate water 
management efforts on a global scale: “[W]ater is often oversupplied 
relative to demand, generally underpriced relative to its intrinsic and 
economic values, and governed by institutions geared to augment 
 
 128.  SUMMIT WATER CAPITAL ADVISORS, http://www.summitwatercapital.com (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2016). 
 129.  US Water Sector Transformation, supra note 11, at 6. 
 130.  See id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. Other financing options for the water sector include private activity bonds, 
infrastructure equity funds, and investments from state revolving funds.  
 133.  HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 292–94.  
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rather than to manage demand.”134 The agricultural sector itself 
comprises an estimated seventy percent of all freshwater consumption 
globally,135 and concepts of “virtual water” reflect the commodification 
of water. 
These complications are further amplified by the fact that water’s 
price, at least in most parts of the world, is not a reflection of water’s 
value in use. Rather, the value of water is a reflection of delivery and 
infrastructure costs, specifically wells, pipes, treatment, and many 
other features. Despite these concerns, economic solutions are at the 
forefront of potential avenues to mitigate water scarcity concerns by 
reducing transaction costs and improving productivity.136 
C.  Role of Water Infrastructure in Economic Growth 
The lack of adequate infrastructure is a seminal challenge in 
achieving an efficient allocation of resources, in terms of both 
economics and providing the right to water. Despite this impediment, 
investment opportunities in the water infrastructure sector establish a 
platform upon which individuals, governments, and private-sector 
investors can reconcile their differences to achieve an efficient 
equilibrium among the various parties. 
Infrastructure has been described in broad terms as “the physical 
framework that supports and sustains virtually all economic activity.”137 
This definition is more alarming considering the consequences that 
affect individuals who cannot even access their right to water because 
their governments cannot provide adequate infrastructure and 
distribution systems.  Because water is the “dominant constituent” for 
human life, the State’s inability to ensure the provision of this resource 
can have vast negative consequences for both citizen and country. The 
failure of governments or public-sector utilities to ensure the 
availability of water—both in sufficient quantity and acceptable 
quality—may influence poverty, food security, human disease, 
economic development, and national security.138 The corresponding 
 
 134.  David B. Brooks, An Operational Definition of Water Management, 22 INT’L J. WATER 
RESOURCES 521, 522 (2006).  
 135.  2030 WATER RESOURCES GROUP, supra note 12, at 6. Of water that is extracted for 
human purposes, in addition to 70% used by agriculture, 20% is used by industry (including power 
generation), and just 10% is used for direct human consumption. Id.  
 136.  See generally DAVID ZETLAND, THE END OF ABUNDANCE: ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS TO 
WATER SCARCITY 31–51 (2011).  
 137.  See STEVE HOFFMAN, PLANET WATER: INVESTING IN THE WORLD’S MOST VALUABLE 
RESOURCE 7–8 (2009). 
 138. Id.  
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contrast is therefore reasonable to presume: if governments do provide 
access to water and sanitation, countries may then experience reduced 
poverty and disease outbreaks as well as increased economic growth. 
Water is the world’s third largest industry after oil & gas 
production and energy generation.139 In many developing countries, 
existing infrastructure is not sufficient to deliver water to its citizens. 
The water distribution system is a complex interconnected network of 
pipes, pumps, and treatment facilities, requiring significant financial 
resources for construction and maintenance. In Madras, India, for 
example, at least fifty percent of the population does not receive access 
to water from the main water infrastructure network.140 The same 
figures are true in Maputo, Mozambique.141 In fact, the figures in 
Bandung, Indonesia, are even higher, as over sixty percent of the 
individuals are not served by the region’s main water network.142 As a 
result, in an empirical study about water distribution systems in 
developing regions of Asia and the Pacific, researchers affiliated with 
the World Bank suggested that private-sector involvement in the 
provision of water was more efficient than otherwise.143 
The lack of adequate water infrastructure is a global issue that 
extends to both developed and developing countries. The problem is 
clear—either the infrastructure does not exist, or if infrastructure does 
exist, significant capital is required to fully modernize the system. On 
the other hand, emerging global markets will present opportunities for 
water-related investments, such as the infrastructure and water 
distribution sectors. Within the global hydrocommerce markets, 
growth drivers like industrialization and urbanization become more 
acute in rapidly expanding economies like China and India.144 These 
countries recognize the vital role of water as it relates to their 
expanding economies. For instance, China makes up 21% of the 
world’s population but only has 7% of the renewable water 
 
 139.  Fabrizio Marrella, On the Changing Structure of International Investment Law: The 
Human Right to Water and ICSID Arbitration, 12 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 335, 335 (2010).  
 140.  SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 7.  
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Antonio Estache & Martin A. Rossi, Comparing the Performance of Public and Private 
Water Companies in Asia and Pacific Region: What a Stochastic Cost Frontier Shows, THE WORLD 
BANK (1999), 
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/10/0000
94946_9908190532063/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
 144.  See HOFFMAN,  supra note 104, at 65–75. 
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resources.145 Water has been mentioned as the single biggest 
impediment to China’s long-term success.146 In its most recent “Five-
Year Plan,” China plans to spend $128 billion over the next five years 
on water infrastructure projects alone.147 
In the U.S., government and industry sources estimate that it will 
cost between $17-$50 billion per year to maintain and repair an 
inefficient water infrastructure system that was constructed more than 
fifty years ago.148 Within the infrastructure sector, capital investments 
can expand the productive capacity of a region, both by increasing 
resources and by enhancing the productivity of existing resources.149 In 
fact, investments in public infrastructure can positively affect the 
economic growth and economic output of the region.150 
D. The “Water Justice” Movement’s Criticism of Private-Sector 
Involvement 
The “water justice” movement arose out of a controversial protest 
in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000.151 After the absolute privatization of 
water utilities lead to a significant increase in prices, widespread civil 
unrest resulted in the Bolivian government cancelling its contract with 
the private sector operator.152 These protests were the symbolic 
beginnings of the anti-privatization sentiment that sparked the human 
right to water movement.153 
 
 145.  See Rob Schmitz, A Warning for Parched China: A City Runs Out of Water, 
MARKETPLACE (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/21/world/warning-
parched-china-city-runs-out-water. 
 146.  See id. (reporting that prominent journalist and author Dai Quing believes China’s water 
crisis is “the greatest danger facing China today.”).  
 147.  See generally CHINA WATER RISKChina’s 12th Five-Year Plan,  
http://chinawaterrisk.org/regulations/water-policy/12th-five-year-plan/ (last visited Sept. 17, 
2017).  
 148.  ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 83.  
 149.  See Alicia H. Munnell, Policy Watch: Infrastructure Investment & Economic Growth, 6 
J. ECON. PERSPS. 189, 190–91 (1992) (stating that public capital investment, including investment 
within the infrastructure section, “can expand the productive capacity of an area, both by 
increasing resources and by enhancing the productivity of existing resources”). 
 150.  Id. at 196–97.  
 151.  Rocio Bustamante et al., Seeing Through the Concept of Water as a Human Right in 
Bolivia, in THE RIGHT TO WATER: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL STRUGGLES 223, 231 
(Farhana Sultana & Alex Loftus eds., 2012)  
 152.   Id. 
 153.  See Id. at 231–32. (noting the “well-documented Water Wars of Cochabama became the 
poster child and impetus for the international Anti-Privatiation and Right to Water Movement 
throughout the 2000s”); see also SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 72–73 
(noting that privatization increased the price of water, leading to civil unrest).  
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In her book Blue Covenant, Maude Barlow strongly criticized 
private-sector involvement in the global water industry.154 Barlow’s 
argument, in terms of the law and economics analysis, is addressed in 
more detail in Section VI. The principle of water as an economic good 
has sparked much controversy within the water justice movement: “the 
treatment of water as an economic good would pave the way for greater 
commodification and privatization, placing control over a vital natural 
resource in the hands of few who would sell it for a price.”155 
Privatization has seemingly gathered a negative connotation, and 
thus the World Bank only uses the term “privatization” when referring 
to complete divestiture of public assets.156 When less than complete 
divestiture is in effect, the World Bank prefers terms like “private 
sector participation” or “public-private partnerships,” particularly 
when referring to leases or management contracts for water 
distribution and infrastructure.157 The contention of this Article is that 
to even begin the public vs. private debate regarding water utilities, 
there must first be an adequate water distribution system in place to 
deliver the water to the consumer. Many governments lack the 
financial resources to complete these infrastructure projects. From a 
practical standpoint, the private sector may be best suited to provide 
the level of capital investment necessary to develop and maintain these 
expensive distribution systems. 
IV. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 
“Eventually, all things merge into one, and a river runs through  
it.”158 
 
A multitude of complex challenges are evident when describing 
the human right to water as a legal obligation. These challenges exist 
because water is fundamental to human existence. Throughout the 
world, legal scholars suggest that a “growing number of national 
constitutions guarantee a right to water.”159 From a biological 
perspective, there is an absolute physical requirement for this natural 
 
 154.  MAUDE BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND 
THE COMING BATTLE FOR THE RIGHT TO WATER 58 (2009).  
 155.  Murthy, supra note 8, at 93. 
 156.  Id. at 124. 
 157.  BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 39.  
 158. NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT AND OTHER STORIES 1 (1976). 
(Need book, requested from library) 
 159.  Rhett B. Larson, The New Right to Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2181 (2013).  
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resource. But it is more than just a resource, as humans have developed 
a cultural, religious, and spiritual appreciation of water that permeates 
almost all notions of humanity.160 
Under international law, the human right to water continues to 
trend towards developing into a legal, justiciable obligation for states.  
Although the legal basis of this right remains a subject of debate in 
legal scholarship,161 for purposes of the law and economics analysis, this 
Article presupposes that the legal status of the right to water will 
continue to progress towards, and ultimately achieve, international 
recognition as an enforceable human right. The following 
developments are presented in support of the prevailing theory that 
the human right to water is evolving into a recognizable obligation for 
states within international and customary law. 
Throughout the historical development of human rights, 
particularly at seminal conferences and conventions during an era 
beginning in the 1950s through the early 1970s,the drafters of 
international legal and institutional agreements “implicitly considered 
water to be a fundamental resource.”162 Thus, these early agreements 
did not explicitly recognize the human right to water.163 The 1977 Mar 
del Plata Conference in Argentina was among the first to recognize the 
human right to water, and much of the subsequent debate can be traced 
to this Conference.164 
The following sub-sections examine various international 
developments that are of particular interest to principles of economic 
 
 160.  The Bible contains many references to water, including Revelations 21:6 (New 
International Version translation) (“To the thirsty I will give water without cost from the spring 
of the water of life.”). Throughout history, civilizations and communities have prospered from 
the resources that living near a river provides, including numerous Native American tribes along 
the banks of the Mississippi River. Many global communities also suffered when that same river 
floods. Perhaps this is the source to help explain the importance of water and waterways from 
religious, cultural, and spiritual perspectives.  
 161.  See, e.g., Hardberger, supra note 5, at 347.  Larson, supra note 159, at 2184. SALMAN & 
MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14 at 8; Peter Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER 
POL’Y 487, 490 (1998). 
 162.  See Gleick, supra note 161, at 490 (noting that among the early human rights conventions 
were the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)).  
 163.  See Murthy, supra note 8, at 92.  
 164.  SALMAN M. A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14 at 9; U.N. 
Water Conference,  Report of the United Nations Water Conference, 37, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.70/29 
(Mar. 14–25,1977). Resolution II issued an Action Plan on “Community Water Supply,” being 
the first of its kind to declare that, “[A]ll peoples, whatever stage of development and their social 
and economic conditions, have the right to access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality 
equal to their basic needs.” See id., at 66; see generally U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev., 
Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (June 3–14, 1992) (reaffirming similar principles).  
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efficiency, as well as examples that suggest that the human right to 
water is evolving into a legal obligation that instills a justiciable duty 
on governments to provide access to this natural resource. 
A.  Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development (1992) 
Although the 1992 International Conference on Water and 
Environment recognized water as a human right, the Dublin Statement 
on Water and Sustainable Development ( “Dublin Statement”) 
emphasized the economic value of water among its four Dublin 
Principles.165 Principle 4 of the Dublin Statement provided that 
“[w]ater has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognized as an economic good.”166 The Dublin Statement recognized 
that water had been historically undervalued from an economic 
perspective, and provided guidance regarding Principle 4: 
Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of 
all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an 
affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic value of water 
has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource. 
Managing water as an economic good is an important way of achieving 
efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and 
protection of water resources.167 
Despite the controversial sentiment that accompanied the 
treatment of water as an economic good, Principle 4 of the Dublin 
Statement influenced and promoted “water services strategies that 
seek to achieve economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, and 
social equity.”168 
Principles of economic efficiency in water use are also relevant to 
Integrated Water Resource Management (“IWRM”), the dominant 
paradigm for water resource management that evolved out of the 
Dublin Principles.169 IWRM is a holistic management approach that 
 
 165.  Int’l Conference on Water and the Env’t, The Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development 4 (Jan. 26–31, 1992) [hereinafter Dublin Statement]. See also SALMAN 
& MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 9 (noting that Principle 4 of the Dublin Statement 
characterizes water as an economic good).  
 166.  Dublin Statement, supra note 165, at 4.  
 167.  Id. (emphasis added). The economic perspectives within the Dublin Statement initiated 
a controversy, which evolved into the water justice movement that opposed private-sector 
involvement in water. The harsh criticism aimed at privatization regimes is discussed in more 
detail infra, at Section VI.  
 168.  Murthy, supra note 8, at 94 (emphasis added).  
 169.  Hugo Tremblay, A Clash of Paradigms in the Water Sector? Tensions and Synergies 
Between Integrated Water Resources Management and the Human Rights-Based Approach to 
Development, 51 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 307, 308 (2011).  
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provides a framework to promote sustainable development while also 
achieving optimal economic efficiency.170 Most importantly, an IWRM 
approach provides a management platform that emphasizes the nexus 
between the contrasting ideologies of economic efficiency in water use 
and social equity.171 
These prevailing economic factors—both opportunity costs and 
social costs—suggest that the Coase Theorem, as well as other 
economic efficiency analyses, may be particularly relevant to solving 
global water challenges.  To further emphasize the relevance of the 
subsequent economic analyses in this Article, the Global Water 
Partnership provides the authoritative definition of IWRM, describing 
the management approach as one that “maximize[s] the resultant 
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.”172 
B.  U.N. General Comment No. 15 (2002) 
The legal basis for the right to water, at least in terms of a soft law 
instrument, was set forth in 2002 by the U.N. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, which adopted the human right to water in 
its General Comment No. 15 (“General Comment”).173 Legal scholars 
suggest that the General Comment was one of the “greatest victories 
to date for those seeking to establish water as a human right.”174 In 
terms of encouraging countries to seek private-sector investments to 
realize the right to water from a practical standpoint, most notable are 
the provisions pertaining to “accessibility” and the “obligation to fulfil” 
the right.175  Paragraph 2 of the General Comment provides the legal 
basis for the right: 
 
 170.  See id. at 311 (“IWRM is a holistic approach applicable to all water resources and water 
uses . . . .”).  
 171.  Id. at 310–11.  
 172.  GLOBAL WATER P’SHIP TECH. ADVISORY COMM., INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT 22 (2000). More recently, additional IWRM definitions were released after the 
2009 World Water Forum and World Water Week. See, e.g., GLOBAL WATER P’SHIP, 
INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE: BETTER WATER MANAGEMENT FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 5 (Roberto Lenton & Mike Muller eds., 2009).  
 173.  See General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 1 (“The Committee has been 
confronted continually with the widespread denial of the right to water in developing as well as 
developed countries.”). The right to water is derived from the right to an adequate standard of 
living (Art. 11) and the right to the highest attainable standard of health. Id. para. 3. See also 
Fabrizio Marrella, On the Changing Structure of International Investment Law: The Human Right 
to Water and ICSID Arbitration, 12 INT’L COMMUN. L. REV. 335, 338 (2010).  
 174.  Hardberger, supra note 5, at 347. 
 175.  General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 25 (emphasis added). 
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The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, 
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and 
domestic uses. An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to 
prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related 
diseases and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and 
domestic hygienic requirements.176 
This right to water is dependent on three normative factors—
availability, quality, and accessibility.177 The accessibility requirement 
implicates notions of economic efficiency, from both a textual 
interpretation perspective and a practical implementation perspective. 
The General Comment offers further elaboration regarding the 
substantive obligations associated with the right to water, noting that 
the obligations are of immediate effect.178 The General Comment also 
recognized the limited financial resources of some countries, but 
nevertheless still provided that countries must take “deliberate, 
concrete, and targeted” steps towards guaranteeing this right to all 
individuals.179 These substantive obligations, particularly the 
accessibility factor, create a foundation for establishing the right to 
water as an enforceable obligation recognized by international law. 
Considering the inadequate infrastructure encompassing the 
global water crisis, the General Comment elaborates on accessibility: 
“[w]ater and water facilities and services have to be accessible to 
everyone without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State 
party.”180 The Drafters of this provision undoubtedly knew of the 
deficient water distribution systems prevalent in both developing and 
developed countries. In practical terms, this definition is central to 
creating an obligation for countries to construct and maintain the 
necessary infrastructure to fulfill the right for all individuals—a starting 
point for answering questions on how and how far the right extends. 
The General Comment further referenced several dimensions of 
accessibility. The “physical accessibility” dimension provides that the  
 
 
 
 176.  Id. para. 2 (emphasis added).  
 177.  Id. para. 12 (proclaiming that the three factors apply in all circumstances, though the 
adequacy of water necessary to fulfill the right may vary according to different conditions).  
 178.  Id. para. 17. 
 179.  Id.; see also SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 65. 
 180.  General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 12(c) (emphasis added). Paragraph 37 
proceeds to confirm the core obligations of General Comment No. 3 (1990), including the 
obligation “[t]o ensure the right of access to water and water facilities and services on a non-
discriminatory basis.” Id. para. 37(c).  
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right extends “for all sections of the population,” and is accessible for 
“each household, educational institution and workplace.”181 
Private-sector participation is further implicated in the General 
Comment’s provision on “General Legal Obligations.” Paragraph 18 
recognizes the practical funding challenges for these large-scale 
projects: “[r]ealization of the right should be feasible and practicable, 
since all States parties exercise control over a broad range of resources, 
including water, technology, financial resources and international 
assistance.”182 Accordingly, the right to water, within the prism of 
human rights, maintains three specific legal obligations, which 
indirectly encourage the right kind of private-sector involvement: the 
obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfil.183 
The obligation to fulfil the right can be viewed as action-based, 
such that it obligates the government to take the steps necessary to 
fulfill the right by facilitating, promoting, and providing the 
accessibility of water to its citizens.184 This includes adopting a national 
water strategy and ensuring that water is affordable for everyone. 
Paragraph 27 is the most encouraging to potential investment 
opportunities because it explicitly references the role of third party 
actors: “[a]ny payment for water services has to be based on the 
principle of equity, ensuring that these services, whether privately or 
publicly provided, are affordable for all, including socially 
disadvantaged groups.”185 The General Comment goes on to mandate 
that states adopt integrated and comprehensive management 
strategies.186 Among the various provisions, the suggestions to increase 
the efficient use of water and reduce water wastage in its distribution 
are relevant to addressing the needs to repair or develop 
infrastructure.187 In fact, the General Comment seemingly 
contemplates private-sector investment in other countries, explicitly 
mentioning “financial and technical assistance” as a means to facilitate 
that country’s ability to fulfil its obligation to provide the right to 
water.188 
 
 181.  Id. para. 12(c)(i). Four dimensions are enumerated to characterize the accessibility 
factor, including physical accessibility, economic accessibility (i.e., affordable for all), non-
discrimination, and information accessibility. Id. 
 182.  Id. para. 18. 
 183.  Id. para. 20.  
 184.  Id. para. 25.  
 185.  Id. para. 27.  
 186.  Id. para. 28. 
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Id. para. 34. (“Depending on the availability of resources, States should facilitate 
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To ensure the accessibility of water, in terms of achieving 
economic efficiency, governments that cannot provide this right to 
their citizens may further be obligated to seek private-sector 
participation through water infrastructure development projects. 
Paragraph 41 of the General Comment provides this function, “If 
resource constraints render it impossible for a State Party to comply 
fully with Covenant obligations, [the State Party] has the burden of 
justifying that every effort has nevertheless been made to use all 
resources.”189 Otherwise, if a state lacks the necessary capital to fund 
projects that will ensure adequate distribution networks, then 
presumably taking “every effort” will implicate the potential for 
increased private-sector participation. The General Comment’s 
provision on “Implementation” does in fact encourage private-sector 
activity. Pursuant to Paragraph 50, countries should adopt legislation 
that helps “operationalize their right to water strategy,” including “the 
intended collaboration with civil society, private sector and 
international organizations.”190 
Although a sense of optimism may be read from its provisions that 
seemingly encourage private-sector participation, the General 
Comment addresses the bad actors that will undoubtedly be present 
among international third-party participants.191 Paragraph 24 provides 
an obligation for states to prevent third-parties (such as private-sector 
operation or control of water services) “from compromising equal, 
affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe, and acceptable 
water.”192 
In 2003, the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
highlighted the underlying concerns and negative externalities that 
may be associated with private sector participation: 
While promoting investment through private-
sector participation in the water and sanitation sector 
might be a possible strategy to upgrade the sector, there 
is concern that private-sector participation might 
threaten the goal of the basic service provision for all, 
particularly the poor, and transform water from being 
 
realization of the right to water in other countries, for example through provision of water 
resources, financial and technical assistance, and provide the necessary aid when required.”). 
 189.  Id. para.41 (emphasis added).  
 190.  Id. para. 50.  
 191.  See generally id. The General Comment refers to the private sector as “third parties” 
throughout. 
 192.  SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 73; General Comment No.15, 
supra note 8, para.24.  
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source basic human need to primarily an economic 
good.193 
These concerns are reasonable because these negative 
externalities have been consequential (e.g., Cochabamba, Bolivia).194 
However, as discussed infra,195 the economic analysis from a country 
perspective offers alternative examples of ways to circumvent these 
negative externalities. Instances of government resourcefulness have 
provided strategies that make it possible to maximize the benefits for 
the private sector and ensure that every citizen receives its right to 
water. 
The provisions of the General Comment (and similar U.N. 
Comments) are intended to clarify the rights within the underlying 
source document, which is further intended to help countries 
implement the U.N. Covenants. The legal basis for the right to water 
remains the source of much advocacy, because “[c]omments are not 
binding per se, can only elucidate existing rights, and cannot create new 
rights or expand existing ones.”196 The General Comment remains 
important, eliciting controversy because some opponents feel that the 
Committee went too far in the creation of a new “right,” whereas 
supporters believe it acknowledged an already existing or implied 
right.197 Perhaps the law and economics analysis can be utilized in 
further support of establishing the legal basis for the right to water. 
C.  U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution 15/9 (2010) 
In July 2010, a resolution on the human right to drinking water 
and sanitation was introduced to the General Assembly.198 
Commentators suggest that the resolution was a surprise for many 
countries, as evidenced by the abstention of forty-one countries from 
the ultimate vote. According to the General Assembly minutes, it 
appears that many of these countries may have chosen to abstain for 
procedural reasons rather than substantive concerns.199  Meanwhile, 
 
 193.  SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 73–74, n. 272. It is important to 
note that the Authors of the quote just finished mentioning the unfortunate situation in 
Cochabamba, and thus may have been considering private-sector involvement in terms of 
absolute privatization of the water utility, rather than some of the more practical investment 
strategies mentioned in this Article. Id. at 72–74.  
 194.  See id. at 72–74 (discussing the effects of privatization on Cochabama, Bolivia).  
 195.  See infra, Section V.B.2 regarding the discussion on economic efficiency for countries.  
 196.  Hardberger, supra note 5, at 348.  
 197.  See Murthy, supra note 8, at 101.  
 198.  G.A. Res. 64/PV.108, supra note 8.  
 199.  Murthy, supra note 8, at 102–03. 
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122 countries voted to adopt a resolution that “[r]ecognizes the right to 
safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right.”200 
In the subsequent months, the U.N. Human Rights Council 
adopted, by consensus on September 30, 2010, Resolution 15/9 on 
human rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation.201 
Resolution 15/9 was more specific than any prior resolution, affirming 
that the right to water is “inextricably related to the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as the right 
to life and human dignity.”202 Most interesting to the future of global 
hydro-commerce, Resolution 15/9 also addressed the role of private-
sector participation in providing access to water.203 According to legal 
scholars, Resolution 15/9 “affirm[ed] that states may opt to involve 
non-state actors provided that they maintain primary responsibility for 
ensuring the realization of human rights.”204 This analysis suggests that 
going forward, countries are obligated to provide access to water, and 
if the government alone cannot provide the right to water then perhaps 
they should seek private-sector participation. 
A closer examination of Resolution 15/9 seemingly provides more 
opportunities for private-sector participation in the delivery of the 
right to water. Clause 7 of Resolution 15/9 “[r]ecognizes that States, in 
accordance with their laws, regulations and public policies, may opt to 
involve non-State actors in the provision of safe drinking water and 
sanitation services and, regardless of the form of provision, should 
ensure transparency, non-discrimination and accountability.”205 In 
effect, the Human Rights Council affirmed that the human right to 
water is not incompatible with private-sector participation. 
D.  State Obligations to Integrate Private-Sector Involvement within 
Water Delivery Regimes 
One assumption underlying the argument in this Article is that the 
General Comments are currently not binding per se, because the 
Committee has no authority to establish new obligations under the 
ICESCR. Nevertheless, scholars argue that the General Comments 
“provide a critical mechanism for developing a normative and 
 
 200.  See G.A. Res. 64/PV.108, supra note 8. 
 201.  Murthy, supra note 8, at 104. 
 202.  Id.   
 203.  Id. “The resolution also has several clauses that address head-on the debate around 
privatization . . . .”. Id. 
 204.  Id. (examining H.R.C. Res. 15/9 at 2).  
 205.  Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, 3 (Oct. 6, 2010).  
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contextualized understanding of the provisions of the ICESCR.”206 Is 
the right to water a justiciable obligation? International law does not 
require agreement for a country to be bound to that idea.207 In the 
context of a human right to water, even countries that abstain from 
signing the international treaty could still be bound by a provision if its 
level of general acceptance as a rule rises to the level of customary 
law.208 
“The human right to water implies considerable state 
responsibility and action.”209 In terms of the availability, quality, and 
accessibility of water, these substantive obligations may invite private-
sector involvement. The right to water is not a reality unless a 
government possesses both plans for implementation and financing.210 
According to the World Water Council (“WWC”), some State 
governments may be reluctant to take progressive steps to implement 
the right to water because they lack financial resources.211 This is 
especially true in developing countries where a significant portion of 
the population lacks sufficient access to water. 
Even the WWC acknowledges, at least indirectly, that the 
implementation of the right to water will involve the private sector: 
“[p]ublic authorities must exercise effective control over water services 
after having chosen the most appropriate management method—
public, private or mixed—for these services. The State should enable 
the sub-sovereign entities to implement [the] right to water.”212 The 
particular modalities of implementation will necessarily differ between 
countries, with regard to whether the infrastructure is available as well 
as whether a large portion of people are lacking access to water. 
Sovereign debt is a particularly complex institution, although the 
following provides a general overview of capital market funding in 
relation to water management projects. As these sub-sovereign 
(regional and local) levels of government begin implementing the right 
 
 206.  SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 5. 
 207.  Amy Hardberger, Whose Job Is It Anyway?: Governmental Obligations Created by the 
Human Right to Water, 41 TEX. INT. L.J. 533, 536–37 (2006), See generally General Comment No. 
15, supra note 8, para. 17 (stating that the Covenant “also imposes on States parties various 
obligations which are of immediate effect.”). 
 208.  See Hardberger, supra note 5 at 536–37.  
 209.  SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 65.  
 210.  CELINE DUBREUIL, THE RIGHT TO WATER: FROM CONCEPT TO IMPLEMENTATION 40 
(2006), 
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Library/RightToWater_FinalText_Cover.pdf. 
 211.  Id. at 13.  
 212.  Id. at 14.  
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to water by providing the infrastructure for the requisite access to the 
resource, capital markets and securities may yield an increasingly 
prominent role.213 Debt instruments, financed by bonds or other 
securities, afford various levels of government the ability to construct 
the infrastructure necessary to implement the right to water. From a 
financial perspective, this allows the governmental authorities to enter 
the capital markets to raise funds for various water management 
projects, while also maintaining focus on long-term financial planning. 
Although there are many funding alternatives, international investors 
may be attracted to the benefits provided by the project diversification 
that is present through participation with distinct local and regional 
governments. 
General Comment 15 further recognizes the relationship between 
the private sector and the implementation of the right to water: 
The international financial institutions, notably the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
should take into account the right to water in their 
lending policies, credit agreements, structural 
adjustment programmes and other development 
projects, so that the enjoyment of the right to water is 
promoted. When examining the reports of State parties 
and their ability to meet the obligations to realize the 
right to water, the Committee will consider the effects 
of the assistance provided by all other actors.214 
Most legal scholars agree that the human right to safe drinking 
water is acknowledged within the arena of international law.215 
However, the actual obligations can be understood as either provision 
rights or participation rights.216 Provision rights are a broad reference 
to the right that has been discussed herein, where the government 
acknowledges substantive obligations to provide minimum quantities 
and qualities of the good or service.217 In comparison, a participation 
right mandates that the government is legally proscribed from 
 
 213.  Stefan Vetter et al., Small is beautiful?, DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH (July 25, 2014), 
https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-
PROD/PROD0000000000338741/Small_is_beautiful%3F_Capital_market_funding_for_sub.pdf.  
 214.  General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 60.  
 215.  See Murthy, supra note 8, at 90 (“While the human right to safe drinking is arguably 
recognized in international law, the legal status of an independent right to sanitation is less 
clear . . . .”). Id.  
 216.  See Larson, supra note 159, at 2181 (“This Article divides all rights into two broad 
categories – provision rights and participation rights.”).  
 217.  See id. at 2209–25.  
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interfering with a citizen’s access to resources controlled by the state.218 
In many countries, the right to water is considered a provision right, 
which could have implications in terms of “enforceability, equity, and 
sustainability.”219 
 
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO WATER AS A LEGAL 
REGIME 
The lack of effective management and inadequate provision of 
water presents challenges that threaten human health, economies, and 
ecosystems. The right to water and private-sector participation may 
appear to be facially incompatible. This sentiment is a matter of 
perspective, one which overlooks the correlative nature of these two 
paradigms. Every citizen in every country needs water. While the 
consequences of private-sector participation have been well-
documented; the practical benefits and positive externalities are all too 
often overlooked. Given the breadth of these implications, one can also 
presume the prevalence of transaction costs and externalities that 
permeate the water distribution industry. 
To further evaluate the allocation of water resources within a law 
and economics context, let us consider a water distribution regime in 
the hypothetical country of Rioland, a developing country that is 
seeking to provide all of its citizens with the right to water while 
continuing to develop as an emerging economic market. In Rioland, 
the government has commissioned an extensive infrastructure project 
that will address their goals. The analysis of this hypothetical can 
disassemble the broader themes, while also explicitly examining the 
three principal parties to a bargain. Here, the underlying bargain is of 
the type that enables the private sector to work with governments in 
the delivery of the right to water, thus benefiting the citizens that 
otherwise would have received this vital resource. Despite the 
transaction costs and externalities that may be apparent in certain 
scenarios, the following analyses provide a framework to achieve an 
efficient equilibrium through cognitive recognition and practical 
consideration of predominant features within the water services 
industry. 
From a macro-level perspective, three principal parties have an 
 
 218.  See id. at 2181 (“With a participation right, the government is legally proscribed from 
interfering with individual citizen’s access to institutions and resources controlled or held in trust by 
the state . . . .”).   
 219.  See id. 
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interest in the water distribution industry within the hypothetical 
country of Rioland. First, governments have overarching interests with 
regard to the bargain concerning water delivery services and 
infrastructure. These government interests may have financial, social, 
health, and cultural implications that must be considered, regardless of 
whether the country benefits from the private sector participation. 
Next, and most importantly, we consider the citizens of Rioland. 
Two types of individuals exist throughout this bargaining process: 
individuals that currently have access to water and individuals that 
cannot access their right to water, either because of physical limitations 
(i.e., inadequate infrastructure) or financial limitations (i.e., cannot 
afford the resource). These distinctions are particularly relevant in the 
evaluation of transaction costs and externalities. 
The final interested party in this bargain is the water distribution 
and infrastructure sector. For the purposes of this analysis, assume that 
a public-private partnership has been formed to operate water 
distribution and services while also developing water infrastructure 
that promotes new projects and maintains existing infrastructure. The 
water distribution regime in Rioland is not indicative of absolute 
privatization, nor does the partnership exhibit monopolistic 
tendencies.220 The partnership is structured in a way that projects are 
financed by capital from a private equity firm, as the public sector 
benefits from transparency and maintains management oversight 
concerning water utility decisions. Assume that this private equity firm 
is the principal investor from the private sector, with significant capital 
from its institutional investors. These investors would like to enter a 
market with potential for immediate growth, while maximizing their 
long-term gains and diversifying their respective portfolios. 
Rioland represents a developing country with the potential to 
experience growth and economic development throughout the 
industrial and agricultural sectors. Rioland would like to begin 
development on a large-scale water infrastructure project that 
improves access to the right to water for its citizens. Moderate in size, 
the country would like to continue trending towards achieving first 
world status, at least in terms of GDP, education, and health. Despite 
the cause for optimism, only 80% of the Rioland citizens have access 
to clean water. Many of the country’s citizens can afford moderate 
prices for the delivery of water, while almost 20% of the citizens do not 
 
 220.  See ZETLAND, supra note 19, 88–90 (discussing in detail, “that success and failure can 
happen at private or public firms, in developed and developing countries”).   
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have access to water. Private-sector participation provides the 
necessary mechanism to fund Rioland’s water infrastructure project. 
Despite the capital investments of $200 million (USD) to improve the 
water delivery system and provide new infrastructure for these 
objectives, the financial realities are evidence that these projects would 
not be possible without the public-private partnership. 
The following discussion will first address the numerous 
transaction costs that permeate the water sector. These costs, 
particularly in the case of certain parties, limit the realization of the 
Coasean ideal. To address transaction costs and efficient outcomes, the 
discussion will utilize the challenges in hypothetical Rioland. In 
addition, further analysis of the parties indicates there is potential to 
achieve an efficient outcome because each party is ultimately made 
better off. This may provide a practical framework that policy-makers 
could rely on within the global water industry. Thus even if the Coase 
Theorem does not apply to this scenario because of high transaction 
costs, the fact that each party benefits suggests that the legal regime 
promoting the right to water exhibits an outcome that obtains an 
efficient equilibrium and high Pareto optimality. 
A.  Coasean Analysis of the Right to Water & Private-Sector 
Participation 
An efficient allocation of resources requires that the transaction 
costs be less than the benefits each party will receive. When two parties 
enter a bargain that lacks transaction costs, the outcome is 
economically efficient according to the underlying principles of the 
Coase Theorem. The complex nature of the water industry, however, 
likely prevents transaction costs from ever being zero. Other 
alternatives may not yield precisely zero transaction costs, yet there are 
opportunities to promote reasonable transaction costs that would 
otherwise be higher. The Coasean analysis provides the channels to 
identify transaction costs and explore the complexities of the water 
distribution industry at the intersection of the right to water and 
private-sector participation. 
Although the allocation of resources in the hypothetical country 
of Rioland may not portray an efficient equilibrium, a law and 
economics analysis via the Coase Theorem offers a practical 
framework to prompt lower transaction costs. With more than two 
parties, each with concealed and unconcealed motivations, the water 
sector inherently contributes to instill a sense of unpredictability. Thus, 
any efforts to achieve an efficient outcome within the arena of global 
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hydro-commerce are influenced by the presence of transaction costs. 
As real world governments pursue developments that fulfill their 
respective obligations to provide access to water, a preliminary 
Coasean analysis offers distinct channels to identify the ultimate 
transaction costs that will be encountered throughout the bargaining 
processes. 
1.  Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are those that occur in the course of making a 
deal. It is difficult to dispute that the complexity of the water industry 
likely impedes the ability to ever achieve zero transaction costs. 
However, there are circumstances that “incentivize activity” by 
promoting the prevalence of lower transaction costs.221 The following 
analysis identifies the transaction costs for each respective party with 
an interest in Rioland’s water industry (i.e., infrastructure & delivery 
of the resource). 
Governmental institutions face myriad transaction costs in the 
transfer or delivery of water to its citizens, analogous to the well-
documented transaction costs in water transfers.222 Transaction costs 
may include administrative costs, expenditures for public agency 
review, costs to search for private-sector investments, scientific 
monitoring costs for hydrology and other disciplines, and brokerage 
service fees, among others.223 Other transaction costs range from 
financing expenditures, including costs associated with debt or interest 
rates, as well as employee fees and political costs. According to water 
scholar Joseph Dellapenna, Coasean economics are misapplied to the 
concept of water markets when there is an assumption that no 
transaction costs are in the exchange.224 
Moreover, the Coase Theorem may be limited in terms of its 
applicability. Rather than being applicable to all allocations of water 
resources, such as the prior appropriation system in the western U.S., 
the Coase Theorem is most applicable when governments facilitate low 
 
 221.  Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 3, at 15–16.  
 222.  See, e.g., Charles W. Howe, Carolyn S. Boggs & Peter Butler, Transaction Costs as 
Determinants of Water Transfers, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 393, 397 (1990); see generally Culp, supra 
note 66, at 117–20.  
 223.  Howe et al., supra note 222, at 397. 
 224.  Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water Law 
Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 397–402. The market system, particularly water markets, often 
overlooks potentially significant barriers by assuming that the fundamentals of the market will 
work themselves out. According to Dellapenna, Coase warned against this “blind faith” when he 
criticized those who ignore basic concerns about the success or failures of markets. Id. at 397–98.  
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transaction costs and secure the property rights.225 As a result, the 
Coase Theorem may be even less applicable within the right to water 
legal regime, where governments often lack the institutional capacity 
to deliver low transaction costs. This is also true in the developing 
world, where many countries have not secured property rights for 
water. 
For individuals, the existence of transaction costs is often rooted 
in the expectation for water, whether financially or physically. Assume 
that 80% of the citizens in Rioland have access to affordable water. 
Interestingly, it is these individuals who will be most implicated by the 
existence of transaction costs. For instance, if water costs are increased 
to offset the 20% of the Rioland population that cannot pay, then these 
transaction costs could prevent an efficient outcome because the costs 
are directly subsumed by those individuals who already have access to 
water (i.e., the 80% pays). As a sole individual, the transaction costs 
may be minimal in comparison if this citizen is required to pay more to 
compensate for the 20% who lack access to water. However, these 
transaction costs strain the bargain when costs are accumulated.226 
Moreover, if the majority of citizens are used to purchasing resources 
at a certain cost, then any tariffs or taxes initiated by the government 
to finance the infrastructure projects can be viewed as a potential 
transaction cost. 
In times of water scarcity, another transaction cost exists when 
additional 20% of citizens are allowed to access a finite resource. The 
Coase Theorem helps identify the contentions that arise out of the 
existence of transaction costs. If 80% of the Rioland population is 
expected to pay more for the same service, to offset the inability to pay 
by 20% of the population, then the resulting outcome suggests that 
transaction costs exist. Nevertheless, as the economic system of 
Rioland continues to develop, perhaps the Coase Theorem will be 
applicable to future water system challenges in Rioland. If these 20% 
of citizens eventually reach the point where they can pay for water, 
then future decisions can rely on Coasean perspectives in its decision-
making. 
 
 
 225.  See infra Section VI for further discussion on Coase Theorem and water rights. See C. 
Carter Ruml, The Coase Theorem and Western U.S. Appropriative Water Rights, 45 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 169, 199 (2005). The lack of property rights for water is particularly relevant to 
citizens in developing countries–the same citizens that lack the accessibility prong of the human 
right to water.  
 226.  See generally HOLLY DOREMUS & DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH 
BASIN 195–96 (2008). 
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Private investors encounter transaction costs because water is 
often considered a public good, for which the government holds in trust 
for the people and ensures equal use for all. In the right to water legal 
regime, private-sector corporations may not have the most incentives 
to produce public goods because consumers will consume goods 
without paying for them. This could be the case in our hypothetical 
Rioland, as the private investors retain fewer profits to compensate for 
the 20% of citizens that cannot afford or lack access to water. As a 
result, transaction costs exist because these private-sector participants 
may not enjoy their maximum level of profitability from their 
investments. Furthermore, additional transaction costs for private 
investors include currency exposure, in addition to the prevailing 
environmental and social pressures. 
2.  Alternative Comparisons 
As a counter-argument, “water justice” activists may argue that 
the existence of transaction costs suggests that private-sector 
participation should not be allowed. However, these same transaction 
costs still exist throughout the water industry with or without private-
sector participation. Thus, the applicability of the Coase Theorem 
remains limited even without corporate involvement. 
Perhaps a non-traditional approach to the Coasian analysis could 
help bridge the gap and expand the applicability of this law and 
economics tool. Using the law and economics approach could evaluate 
the varying degrees of transaction costs within this particular aspect of 
the water industry. In other words, does private-sector participation in 
the delivery of water either increase or decrease the transaction costs? 
If one particular scenario or investment scheme in a region has lower 
transaction costs, then the justifications for participation in certain 
regions could be evident. 
If these transaction costs decrease with corporate involvement, 
then we should allow private-sector participation. However, if these 
transaction costs remain present or even increase, then perhaps Maude 
Barlow and the “water justice” movement have a stronger argument. 
In that case, some regulatory palliatives may be necessary. Thus, 
Pigouvian taxation could have a role if the nature of the regulation 
actually offsets the transaction costs associated with a Coasean 
solution. 
The “water justice” movement’s argument against the private 
sector seemingly relies on the pessimistic view that corporations are all 
strictly motivated by profit and the public sector is strictly motivated 
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by the common good. This argument does not address the practicality 
of allowing the private sector to perform the water delivery tasks that 
the government could not perform. Most importantly, the argument in 
favor of public-sector control of the water sector relies on a misguided 
view that all actors in the public sector are motivated by the common 
good. In reality, many public-sector actors are motivated by political 
power and there is not a utopian common good. The narrative that 
compares the “bad” private-sector with the “good” public-sector is not 
useful or correct. As referenced throughout the Article, both sectors 
have experienced successes and failures, and thus we can conclude that 
neither approach is overwhelmingly “ideal.” Therefore, we should 
instead look for a second-best solution to achieve an efficient outcome. 
The nature of the water industry is complex, so perhaps this 
alternative approach will help policy-makers. “Every water basin, 
urban area and household has a unique water fingerprint that reflects 
the influence of local hydrology, cultural norms, history, 
environmental constraints, political and economic structures, and 
other institutional characteristics . . . . The causes of a water shortage 
in Atlanta may differ from those of a shortage in Cairo, but their 
solutions may share similarities.”227 Keeping this in mind, it is 
important to recognize that the type and degree of transaction costs 
will vary throughout the world. The following section provides the 
benefits that accompany private-sector participation. 
B.  Does Private-Sector Involvement in the Delivery of the Right to 
Water Yield an Efficient Economic Outcome? 
Taking an alternative approach, it is also likely that encouraging 
private-sector participation in the delivery of the right to water will 
result in an efficient outcome. In fact, the notion that this scenario rises 
to the level of Pareto superiority is further supported by the idea that 
neither of the three parties is made worse off by this allocation of 
resources. When an alteration can be made that makes at least one 
person better off and no one worse off, this allocation of resources will 
be an efficient outcome and Pareto superior. According to legal scholar 
Gary Lawson, an efficient outcome of Pareto superiority represents a 
“change or action . . . mak[ing] at least one person better off by his own 
standards and no one worse off by her own standards.”228 The scenario 
is the most socially, morally, and economically desired outcome.229 By 
 
 227.  ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 23.  
 228.  Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 85 (1992).  
 229.  Id.  
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recognizing efficient outcomes that are positive for all parties, the law 
and economics approach may have broad applicability throughout the 
realm of global hydrocommerce, particularly in the realm of 
infrastructure development and access to water. Thus, even though the 
prevailing transaction costs in reality limit the Coase Thereom’s 
applicability under these circumstances, policy-makers can still benefit 
from seeking to stimulate an economically efficient outcome. 
1.  Efficient Outcome for Individuals: The Indispensable 
Element for Human Life 
As recognized in the opening statement of General Comment No. 
15, “[t]he human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in 
human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human 
rights.”230 Based on this text alone, the benefits associated with the 
access to right to water are clearly recognizable. From the individual’s 
perspective, access to water has wide-reaching implications, which both 
directly and indirectly relate to health, jobs, social rights, gender 
equality, economics, and education, among other benefits. Thus, 
providing citizens with access to water results in an efficient outcome 
because it would make individuals better off. Social and economic 
development are directly linked by the centrality and fundamental 
nature of water.231 For individuals, water is directly related to all facets 
of life, and “the effective access of citizens to safe water and sanitation 
is crucial.”232 
Providing access to water for individuals is the first step at 
reducing many aspects of poverty in the developing world. Water 
poverty results when people lack access to dependable quantities and 
quality of water, or lack the capacity to use these water resources. 
Water may be insufficient for basic human needs and food production, 
while also influencing the availability of economic and ecosystem 
services.233 The linkage between economic poverty and the lack of 
water is well-established.234 Poverty is prevalent mostly in water-short 
areas.235 The majority of those without sufficient drinking water and  
 
 230.  General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 1. 
 231.  See generally Young, supra note 72, at 9–35. 
 232.  Note, What price for the priceless?: Implementing the justiciability of the right to water, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1067 (2007), available at http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdfs/note.pdf. 
 233.  See WARD et al., supra note 74, at 177–80.  
 234.  Id.  
 235.  Id. 
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sanitation are in the more impoverished regions of the developing 
world.236 
Inadequate water supply and sanitation can have an enormous 
impact on the health of individuals. The poor health of its citizens also 
affect the entire economy of a country. The lack of water and sanitation 
services is directly correlated to disease and sickness. Further, 
individuals cannot work and contribute to the local or national 
economy when they are sick or providing care for their sick family 
members.237 Medical treatment also requires considerable 
expenditures. When water is not provided in sufficient quality, this 
unclean resource causes water-borne diseases such as diarrhea, among 
other bacterial infections and diseases. In fact, after malaria and 
respiratory infections, diarrhea is the third highest cause of child 
mortality in West Africa.238 
In the developing world, access to water may help limit the 
prevalence of certain gender inequality issues.239 Women and children 
must devote time to carrying or carting the water from its source when 
the water is not available in the home. This disparity is primarily 
inflicted upon the poorest of minorities.240 In East Africa, for instance, 
more than a quarter of the total population resides in conditions where 
each trip to collect water from its source takes over a half an hour.241 
As a result, gender inequality issues become more entrenched because 
this time-commitment erodes the capacity of women to engage in other 
activities such as education or gainful employment.242 For children, the 
responsibility for collecting water means they have fewer opportunities 
to attend school, further decreasing their chances of escaping 
poverty.243 
 
 
 236.  Roberto Danino, Forward to SALMON & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT 
TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS vii–vii (David Freestone and Salman M.A. Salman 
eds.) (2004). 
 237.  See generally Young, supra note 72, at 9–11.  
 238.  See id. 
 239.  SAVITRI BISNATH, MACROECONOMICS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS TO WATER AND 
SANITATION (2011), Meeting Report at 10 (Center for Women’s Global Leadership 2011).  
 240.  Id. (“Without specific attention to disadvantaged groups, often living in poorer regions, 
government transfers could result in widening regional disparities and perpetuate 
discrimination.”). 
 241.  UNICEF, Progress on Sanitation and Drinking-Water (2010), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44272/1/9789241563956_eng.pdf  
 242.  Young, supra note 72, at 3. 
 243.  Id. at 10.  
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Taking the Rioland hypothetical as an example, upon beginning 
construction of the water infrastructure project, the benefits for 
individuals will be vast. Immediately, many citizens of Rioland will 
have the opportunity to seek employment that is directly related to the 
project’s development. Rioland citizens will also benefit from the jobs 
that come with managing and maintaining the water infrastructure 
when construction is completed. Citizens will even benefit as the 
country improves its economic potential by providing clean water and 
adequate sanitation to all its citizens. 
Therefore, encouraging private-sector participation in the 
provision of the right to water may lead to an efficient outcome for 
individuals. The wide-reaching benefits include economic growth and 
jobs, as well as improvements in health, education, gender equality, 
and food security. 
2.  Efficient Outcome for Countries: Precondition for Economic 
Progress 
In many countries, both in the developing and developed worlds, 
there are vast benefits to be had from improvements in the water 
infrastructure sector. By seeking private-sector participation, these 
improvements will allow individuals to access their right to clean water 
and adequate sanitation. In fact, early investments by states in the 
“provision of these services appears to be a precondition for 
progress,”244 particularly given the resulting economic, social, 
environmental, and educational benefits, among many others. As the 
population of certain states continues to increase, water constraints 
and scarcity may negatively influence economic development, 
especially in geographic regions where water is traditionally scarce.245 
From a national perspective, access to clean water and education 
are the most consistent predictors of economic progress.246 According 
to researchers, “[d]irect benefits to society can be expected to flow 
from both increased investment in the water supply and sanitation 
sector, including investment in the conservation of ecosystems critical 
for water.”247 The lack of water affects the well-being of individuals and 
their quality of life, which in turn affects the State. This lack of clean 
water, whether in quality or quantity, influences the State’s poverty 
 
 244.  Id. at 35.  
 245.  HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 9. 
 246.  See generally Ward et al., supra note 74.  
 247.  Young, supra note 72, at 35. 
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levels and inability to escape poverty,248 food security, and the 
proliferation of disease.249 Further, the availability of water for all 
citizens may positively influence economic development, while also 
reducing the State’s need to secure additional resources through 
geopolitical conflicts or even wars. 
In the case of our hypothetical Rioland, investments in water 
infrastructure will have far-reaching positive benefits, directly and 
indirectly benefitting the entire country, not just those individuals who 
already have access to water. In the initial stages, the creation of jobs 
may stimulate the economy. By reducing waste, this water can be 
conserved for the environmental or utilized in the agricultural sector 
to address food security issues. Over the long-term, having the 
necessary infrastructure will aid economic growth and development. 
Indirectly, providing access to water may lead to the development of 
additional industries, allowing the country to look more attractive to 
investors. 
When a country seeks private-sector investments to pursue water 
development projects, the country will experience health-related 
benefits. According to a cost-benefits report by the World Health 
Organization, and depending on location, the economic benefits of 
each dollar invested in improved drinking water and sanitation ranges 
from $3 to $34.250 This represents the benefits that arise from 
preventing disease in the first place, rather than treating infections 
after the fact. The adverse impacts of diseases from lack of access to 
water and sanitation also have economic implications for countries. In 
addition, the lack of access to water and sanitation leads to diseases 
among the most vulnerable groups of citizens, both children and the 
elderly population.251 
The annual economic impacts from poor sanitation are 
widespread. Alarmingly, Peter Gleick predicted in 2002 that “as many 
as 76 million people will die by 2020 of preventable water-related 
diseases.”252 The costs incurred by governments to address water-borne 
diseases are substantial, resulting from inadequate water sanitation 
services in places like Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
 
 248.  HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 9 (“[l]ack of water does not cause poverty, but poverty 
virtually always includes a lack of water”). 
 249.  Id. 
 250.   Id. at 44–46. 
 251.  SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 7–8. 
 252.  Peter H. Gleick, DIRTY WATER: ESTIMATED DEATHS FROM WATER-RELATED 
DISEASES 2000-2020, at 9 (2002), http://www.pacinst/org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/ 
water_related_deaths_report3.pdf.  
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Vietnam, among others.253 These four countries lose a combined total 
of $9 billion (USD) annually due to inadequate water sanitation, which 
is approximately two percent of their combined GDP (based on 2005 
figures).254 Lack of water and sanitation contributed to the cholera 
epidemic suffered by Peru in 1991. This epidemic cost the government 
over $1 billion in expenditures to control, treat, and prevent the spread 
of the disease. If only a fraction of these costs (estimated $100 million 
(USD)) had initially taken place to ensure the adequate provision of 
water and sanitation, this severity of the epidemic likely would not 
have occurred.255 
Scientists acknowledge a correlation between threats to 
biodiversity and ecosystems, with threats to water security.256 When the 
threat to human water security is high, the threat to biodiversity is also 
high.257 Adequate water infrastructure ensures that the water for 
human, industrial, and agricultural consumption is not wasted. When 
this water leaks in large quantities from the existing distribution 
network, this water is not returned to the ecosystem. There are 
significant opportunities for governments to protect natural 
ecosystems and improve biodiversity outcomes by investing in water 
infrastructure projects.258 
Some economists suggest that investments in public infrastructure 
can have significant effects that are positive for economic output and 
economic growth.259 In terms of economic development, perhaps our 
hypothetical Rioland could look to the nation of Turkey as an example. 
In 2015, Turkey announced its $10 billion Southeastern Anatolia 
Project (“GAP Project”), which covers the southeastern portion of 
Turkey, the region that is located between the Euphrates and Tigris 
Rivers.260 The GAP Project will improve Turkey’s irrigation, drinking 
water infrastructure, and energy sectors (e.g., hydroelectric power 
plants). In terms of benefits, the GAP Project is expected to improve 
 
 253.  Within Indonesia alone, the annual economic impact of inadequate sanitation is 
approximately $6.3 billion (USD). Young, supra note 72, at 9.  
 254.  Young, supra note 72, at 3.  
 255.  2030 WATER RESOURCES GROUP, supra note 12, at 9–10.  
 256.  Id. at 7.  
 257.  Vorosmarty, supra note 77, at 556–61. 
 258.  See id. 
 259.  See generally Munnell, supra note 149, at 196 (discussing benefits proponents of 
infrastructure investments argue). 
 260.  Ali Unal, Turkey will invest $10 billion in southeastern Anatolia Project, DAILY SABAH, 
Mar. 8, 2015, https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2015/03/08/turkey-will-invest-10-billion-in-
southeastern-anatolia-project. 
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the economy in many ways, including employment for over a million 
people.261 According to the Prime Minister of Turkey, the five main 
pillars of the project include economic growth, social development, city 
planning, infrastructure development, and enhanced institutional 
capacity.262 
For developing countries, including Turkey, Rioland, and many 
others, building adequate infrastructure helps transform the economy 
and accelerates social development. For Turkey, this project will not 
only reduce unemployment within the country, but will substantially 
raise the region’s exports: “[m]acroeconomic policies affect the 
operation of the economy as a whole, shaping the availability and 
distribution of resources.”263 
There are obvious questions with regards to financing the capital-
intensive projects to fulfil the right to water. In particular, how will the 
respective governments uphold its obligation to repay the private 
sector investors, especially if the impoverished proportion of the 
population cannot afford to purchase the right to access the water? 
Because the General Comment ensures water for all, the answer to this 
question involves examining instances of government creativity and 
adaptability throughout the world. For example, in Durban, South 
Africa, each citizen is entitled by law to six free kiloliters of water per 
month.264 Citizens are then required to pay for any consumption 
beyond this amount.265 In another example of government 
resourcefulness, the Water Code of the Republic of Armenia provides 
for financial assistance in two forms, either as subsidies for the poor 
water users that cannot pay or as tax benefits to water suppliers.266 
In Santiago, Chile, water vouchers are provided for families that 
fall below the poverty line to pay their water bills.267 Although an 
 
 261.  Id.  
 262.  Id.  
 263.   SAVITRI BISNATH, MACROECONOMICS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS TO WATER AND 
SANITATION (2011), Meeting Report at 7 (Center for Women’s Global Leadership 2011). 
“Macroeconomic policy refers to fiscal (public revenue and public expenditure) and monetary 
policies (including policies on interest and exchange rates and the money supply), which impact 
on the economy and living standards, including the levels of employment and growth and the 
prices and availability of basic social services, such as water and sanitation.” Id.  
 264.  SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 71.  
 265.  See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 71, n. 262, 298 (discussing 
Manquele v. Durban Transitional Metropolitan, Council Case, South Africa No. 2036/2000).  
 266.  See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 72, n. 264 (noting that the 
provision was adopted by Armenia on June 4, 2002, with the intention of ensuring equal 
conditions for all and avoiding discrimination in the supply of water).   
 267.  Id. at 71–72. 
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apparent contradiction existed as the government subsidized water to 
the poor, while requiring the water utility to function as a commercial 
entity, the outcome was indicative of economic efficiency. In fact, the 
following quote depicts a Pareto optimal scenario, whereby both 
parties were made better, without either becoming worse off: “[t]he 
utility then not only strengthened its focus…but now had clear 
incentive to serve the poor, who became revenue-generating customers 
like all others. The system works well.”268 It could be argued that the 
government was made worse off because it was temporarily burdened 
by the payment. However, this notion is refuted by the fact that the 
government achieved its objective (i.e., providing all citizens with their 
right to water), and by recognizing the long-term benefits for the 
country through improved health and reduced chances for water-borne 
disease (i.e., less healthcare costs for the government). 
Tariffs and costs to pay for these infrastructure projects may be 
viewed in an unfavorable light initially because citizens will generally 
prefer to pay less. However, if governments can have the foresight to 
see beyond this likely temporary resistance during the interim, the 
long-term benefit will be abundantly positive, as citizens begin to 
recognize the benefits of preventing waste and using less quantities of 
this essential resource. These infrastructure projects will indirectly 
benefit water conservation.269 When a price is attached, governments 
are forced to be more mindful of how much they are using across the 
country, not just the price of water but the price for the 
infrastructure.270 
Therefore, encouraging private-sector participation in the 
provision of the right to water may lead to an efficient outcome for 
individuals. The wide-reaching benefits include economic growth and 
reduced unemployment rates, as well as a healthier and more educated 
population. 
3.  Efficient Outcome for Private-Sector Investors: “Blue Gold” 
& Wealth Maximization 
The efficient outcome for private sector investors is the most 
clearly identifiable of all the parties. As mentioned above, many 
corporations and investors will likely experience an abundance of 
 
 268.  Id. at 72, n. 263  (citing World Water Vision (Commission Report), A Water Secure 
World: Vision for Water, Life, and the Environment 36, WORLD WATER COUNCIL (2006)).  
 269.  See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 
1882 (2005) (discussing government rules and regulations as incentives for water conservation).  
 270.  Id. at 1883.  
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profits from many facets of the water industry. Although wealth 
maximization is the primary motivation that makes this party better 
off, the fact that private investors are helping provide the human right 
to water may look good to shareholders, particularly as we enter an era 
of corporate sustainability. 
Investors must contend with numerous risks and transaction costs 
in the realm of water resources, including insufficient economic data, 
opaque management, and stakeholders being inadequately linked. 
According to a 2030 Water Resources Group publication, “water 
resources face inefficient allocation and poor investment patterns 
because investors lack a consistent basis for economically rational 
decision-making.”271 As demand for water grows in emerging markets, 
the inefficiency among the current water distribution schemes will be 
inadequate to ensure the provision of water. These same emerging 
markets present many opportunities for private-sector participation. 
As the right to water becomes a justiciable obligation for 
countries, perhaps this may trigger the increased participation of 
private-sector investors, as many of these countries could otherwise not 
finance these large-scale infrastructure projects. Because the 
individuals, states, and private-sector are each made better off, the 
preceding analysis suggests that private-sector participation in water 
distribution is an allocation of resources that is likely Pareto optimal, 
thus achieving an efficient equilibrium. 
VI. SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES: THE WATER JUSTICE MOVEMENT’S 
CONDEMNATION OF PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTICIPATION 
Scenarios that invite private-sector involvement within the 
delivery of the right to water are representative of efficient outcomes, 
and thus align with the Coase Theorem. In a general sense, the Coase 
Theorem provides that when transaction costs are zero, such as when 
any agreement that is in the mutual benefit of the parties concerned 
gets made, then any initial definition of property rights leads to an 
efficient outcome.272 Agreements between governments and investors 
from the private sector, as explained above, are mutually beneficial to 
each party. These agreements between governments and investors also 
provide an efficient platform to achieve zero transaction costs. 
Countries and individuals both benefit because the governments will 
be better suited to provide their citizens with water, the fundamental 
 
 271.  2030 WATER RESOURCES GROUP, supra note 12, at 4.  
 272.  See generally Friedman, Swedes Get it Right, supra note 45.  
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necessity to all aspects of life. Private-sector investors benefit through 
the pursuit of global profits within the lucrative hydrocommerce 
industry. The main distinction is that the Coase Theorem addressed 
property rights, rather than human rights, as in the right to water. 
Although this distinction has sparked debate, a thorough Coasian 
analysis supports the notion that an efficient economic outcome can be 
achieved through cooperation between governments and the private 
sector, at least in the delivery of the human right to water. 
Nevertheless, closer examination of the property rights described 
in The Problem of Social Cost resembles the human right to water 
regime, at least within the context of the relationship between private-
sector involvement and this right to water. Coase’s analysis is similar 
to this Article because it relies upon a mosaic of rights among various 
parties “to carry out a circumscribed list of actions.”273 For instance, the 
landowner does not possess unlimited rights. The landowner may not 
have the right to build certain structures or grow certain crops on his 
land. Other parties may even have rights to use or cross the land. As 
Coase reasons, “[t]he cost of exercising a right…is always the loss 
which is suffered elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that 
right” such that the most desirable social arrangements prompt results 
where “what was gained was worth more than what was lost.”274 
Based on the Coasian premise that rights are not unlimited, 
individuals have the right to access water but neither these individuals 
nor their governments possess the right to exclude the corresponding 
rights of the private sector to participate in the delivery of the right to 
water. Individuals, governments, and the private sector each possess 
distinct, yet interconnected rights within the water industry. 
Recognition of these rights may lead to the most economically efficient 
outcome because minimal costs will be associated with the exercise of 
these rights. Much more will be gained than what is lost: individuals 
receive a fundamental necessity of life, governments benefit from 
increased health within their country, and corporations obtain 
significant profits within the water industry.275 In terms of water 
markets, noted scholar Robert Glennon explains the relationship 
between rights and efficiency:  
An ability to transfer ownership creates an 
incentive to use property more productively. This is the 
core idea of markets. Owners of property assess the 
 
 273.  See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3. 
 274.  Id.  
 275.  Id. 
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value of it to them and part with it if they will realize a 
profit. Buyers seek to change the use of property and 
capture the value added by the new use. In this process, 
both sellers and buyers make profits, and society 
benefits from increased efficiency.276 
But what happens when governments cannot fulfill this obligation 
to deliver water and provide this basic necessity of life to its citizens? 
The more than two billion people that lack access to clean water are 
proof that governments, in their sole capacity, are not equipped with 
the resources and capital necessary to deliver this obligation. As one 
commentator says, “Given the capital failure of the public sector to 
supply poor people with clean water, the positions and actions of anti-
privatization activists are hard to understand”, concluding that the 
water justice activists “are driven by an ideologically inspired aversion 
to enterprise.”277 
These activists who oppose corporate participation in the global 
water industry also acknowledge this alarming statistic, but argue that 
the predominant roadblock to governmental failure to provide clean 
water is because “they are burdened by their debt to the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund.”278 While this may be true to a 
limited extent, the underlying reality remains the same: governments 
are failing to fulfill their obligation to deliver water to its citizens. It is 
here that the pragmatic argument in favor of private-sector 
involvement begins to flow cohesively within the economic currents of 
the Coase Theorem. Perhaps a shift in baseline perspectives—very 
much akin to the “change of approach” suggested by Coase279—to 
those perspectives that embrace an economic analysis by encompassing 
all relevant factors, will begin to facilitate the reconciliation between 
water justice activists and private-sector investors within the arena of 
global hydrocommerce. 
In Blue Covenant, water justice activist Maude Barlow levied 
harsh criticism aimed at private-sector involvement in the human right 
to water.  Barlow does not completely reject private-sector 
 
 276.  Glennon, supra note 75, at 1887.  
 277.  Segerfeldt, supra note 74, at 4 (explaining that these anti-privatization groups also have 
a profound suspicion of the market economy and business enterprise in general, as well as belief 
in the “superior ability” of the public sector to deliver the needs of citizens).   
 278.  BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 159.  
 279.  Coase, supra note 3, at 42 (suggesting that a change in approach to welfare economics is 
necessary to ensure economists arrive at correct conclusions about “the treatment of harmful 
effects”).  
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participation as an absolute;280 The overarching sentiment is that the 
human right to water should be void of corporate investments.281 
“Private transnational corporations cannot maintain a competitive 
position in the water industry if they operate on the principles of water 
conservation, water justice and water democracy.”282 Instead, Barlow 
suggests that the better scenario is one in which “[o]nly governments, 
with their mandate to work in the public good, can operate on these 
principles.”283 Within a Coasian analysis context, the arguments against 
private-sector involvement in the right to water seemingly 
“concentrate[ ] attention on particular deficiencies,”284 such that the 
water justice movement’s disparagement of corporate participation 
may theoretically “nourish the belief that any measure which will 
remove the deficiency is necessarily desirable.”285 
The alleged “deficiency,” at least according to water justice 
activists, is that profit-driven corporations will inevitably disrupt the 
right to water.286 But the reality, which water justice activists often 
overlook, is that many governments cannot fulfill their obligation to 
deliver this particular human right to its citizens. In Coasian terms, if 
the “corrective measure” is to prevent private-sector investment in the 
water industry, Barlow’s argument may divert attention from other 
changes associated with sole reliance on the government to deliver 
water to its citizens.287 The realities stemming from these other changes 
are that the right to water is either delivered inefficiently or not at all—
”changes which may well produce more harm than the original 
deficiency.”288 Legal scholars tend to agree, although indirectly, with 
the pragmatic undercurrents of the Coasian approach: “From a human 
rights perspective, the important question is not whether a private 
 
 280.  BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 161. Despite the anti-corporation sentiment expressed 
throughout the book, Barlow does somewhat qualify the criticism as not being an absolute. “That 
is not to say there is no role for the private sector in finding solutions to the global water crisis. 
But all private sector activity must come under strict public oversight and government 
accountability, and all would have to operate within a program whose goals are conservation and 
water justice.” Id.  
 281.  See generally id.  
 282.  Id. at 162. 
 283.  Id. at 162. 
 284.  Coase, supra note 3, at 42. 
 285.  Coase, supra note 3, at 42–43. 
 286.  BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 161-62. “The creation of a worldwide water cartel is wrong 
ethically, environmentally and socially and ensures that decisions regarding the allocation of 
water are made based on commercial, not environmental or social, concerns.” 
 287.  Id.  
 288.  Coase, supra note 3, at 43. 
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sector entity is involved in the delivery of services, but how the 
arrangement is structured, implemented, and monitored.”289 
Coase qualified the scope of his analysis in The Problem of Social 
Cost, suggesting that his comparisons were confined to the value of 
production. Although his analysis may have been limited in that sense, 
Coase reasoned that choices between different solutions should be 
examined in “broader terms,” such that the “total effect of these 
arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account.”290 
Nevertheless, Barlow’s argument is not one that considers whether 
varying degrees of private-sector involvement could be acceptable. She 
suggests that corporate participation in the water industry is 
“criminal,” a scenario in which corporations “impos[e] a new form of 
colonial conquest dressed up as the one and only economic model 
available.”291 These water justice activists point to examples of failed 
private-sector participation in Cochabamba, Bolivia292 and Kwazule-
Natal, South Africa,293 as reasons to suggest that water corporations 
“should be forced to leave poor countries.”294 Because this diverts 
attention to these unsuccessful examples, it is important to reconsider 
whether or not the failed ventures were necessarily the result of 
private-sector investment per se or instead rooted in bespoke 
occurrences that could not be resolved.  Thus, the argument against 
private-sector participation does not embrace the “totality of 
circumstances,” at least not within the broader economic context that 
Coase preferred. 
Relying entirely on government regulation or oversight may lead 
to ineffective outcomes because the “government is attempting to do 
too much,” such that the public sector “has reached the stage at which, 
for many of its activities, as economists would say, the marginal product 
is negative.”295 Rather than admonishing the potential effects of 
 
 289.  Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning, 
and the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 
90 (2013).  
 290.  Coase, supra note 3, at 42–44. 
 291.  BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 160. 
 292.  See Kapoor supra note 90, at 163. See also OSCAR OLIVERA & TOM LEWIS, 
COCHABAMBA: WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA (2004) (describing shortcomings of water privatization 
in Cochabamba); Willem Assies, David versus Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, 
Neoliberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia, 30 LATIN AM. PERSP. 14, 30 (2003).  
 293.  See generally Kapoor, supra note 90, at 177. See also Jacques Pauw, The Politics of 
Underdevelopment: Metered to Death – How a Water Experiment Caused Riots and a Cholera 
Epidemic, 33 INT’L J. HEALTH SERV. 819 (2003).  
 294.  BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 160. 
 295.  R.H. Coase, Economists and Public Policy, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND 
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corporate participation as Barlow suggests,296 should we instead 
examine what private-sector involvement can do? The global water 
challenges are much too vast to completely ostracize an entire sector. 
The shortfalls that permeate Barlow’s water justice argument are 
similar to the inadequacies within the Pigouvian tradition that Coase 
demonstrated. The policy conclusions of both Barlow and Pigou are 
“the result of not comparing the total product obtainable with 
alternative social arrangements.”297 
For example, Coase criticized the scenario in which regulations 
(such as zoning regulations or a Pigouvian tax) would force smoke-
producing factories to be removed from areas where the smoke causes 
harmful effects. These measures would result in reduced production, 
an outcome that should be weighed against the harm if the factory 
remained. In comparison, Barlow’s suggestion to eliminate private-
sector involvement may reduce the potential for corporate failure (or 
harm), but this certainly would not improve the abilities of 
governments to provide the right to water. The significant harm that 
would arise by not permitting private-sector participation and 
governments subsequently not fulfilling their obligation to deliver the 
right to water would be a disastrous outcome that should be weighed 
against the random harm that could result from corporate involvement 
on occasion. As Coase might say, the aim of such policy considerations 
“should not be to eliminate” externalities such as smoke pollution and 
intermittent corporate harm, “but rather to secure the optimum 
amount” of smoke-emitting factories and participation by the private 
sector in delivering the right to water, thereby ensuring the “amount 
which will maximise the value of production.”298 
VII. CONCLUSION 
To meet all competing demands and achieve economic efficiency, 
in light of existing market dynamics, there must be a concerted effort 
among stakeholders to adopt a holistic resource view that 
acknowledges water as the key input for economic development, social 
and cultural growth, and environmental conservation. As shown by the 
nearly two billion people around the world lacking access to clean 
water, governments are currently falling short of their obligation to 
provide the human right to water. Governments should therefore be 
 
ECONOMISTS 34, 62 (The University of Chicago Press 1994). 
 296.  BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 101.  
 297.  Coase, supra note 3, at 39–40. 
 298.  Coase, supra note 3, at 42. 
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encouraged to seek private-sector investors to successfully provide 
their citizens with water. Many of these developments will be in the 
form of water infrastructure projects, involving three main parties. The 
allocation of resources among these parties, including citizens, 
countries, and private-sector investors, may be an efficient outcome, 
even despite the existence of transaction costs. 
 
